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LIGHT, SMOKE, AND FIRE: HOW STATE 
LAW CAN PROVIDE MEDICAL MARIJUANA 
USERS PROTECTION FROM WORKPLACE 
DISCRIMINATION 
Abstract: Currently, twenty-three states and the District of Columbia have enact-
ed legislation providing an affirmative defense to prosecution under state law for 
medical marijuana use by qualified patients. Despite growing public and legisla-
tive support for the legalization of medical marijuana, marijuana use—both  recre-
ational and medicinal—remains illegal under the federal Controlled Substances 
Act. Given the inconsistency between state and federal law concerning the legality 
of medicinal marijuana, there is significant uncertainty regarding the rights of em-
ployees to enjoy their new medical marijuana privileges. To date, courts have re-
fused to grant protections to employees who have suffered adverse employment 
action for their off-duty, state-sanctioned medical marijuana use. Although the ex-
isting case law has unanimously favored employers, the existence of strongly writ-
ten dissenting opinions that favor employees as well as the adoption by several 
states of statutory discrimination protections for medical marijuana users signifies 
that this existing precedent could easily change. This Note argues that courts 
should allow employees’ claims for disability discrimination to proceed under 
state law, and that state legislatures should amend their current medical marijuana 
statutes to afford employment discrimination protection to qualified patients. In 
doing so, states will be able to protect disabled employees from discrimination 
due to their use of a state-sanctioned therapeutic remedy. 
INTRODUCTION 
Gary Ross suffers from back pain as a result of injuries sustained in 1983 
during his service with the United States Air Force.1 When conventional medi-
cations failed to provide relief, Ross’s doctor recommended medical marijuana 
for his pain.2 After beginning medical marijuana treatment in 1999, Ross’s job 
performance as a telecommunications system administrator never suffered due 
to his medical marijuana use.3 In September 2001, when Ross accepted em-
ployment with a new telecommunications company, he was subject to a pre-
employment drug test and tested positive for tetrahydrocannabinol, the active 
                                                                                                                           
 1 Ross v. RagingWire Telecomms., Inc., 174 P.3d 200, 203 (Cal. 2008). 
 2 Id. Ross resides in California where the Compassionate Use Act of 1996 is in effect. Id. See 
generally CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 11362.5 (West 2007 & Supp. 2014) (explaining that one 
of the purposes of the Act is to allow qualified patients to obtain and use medical marijuana without 
being subjected to criminal prosecution or sanction). 
 3 Ross, 174 P.3d at 203. 
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chemical in marijuana.4 Although Ross’s medical use of marijuana was state 
sanctioned and conducted while off duty, the employer discharged Ross without 
offering any accommodation for Ross’s back condition.5 Ross sued the employer 
for disability discrimination, but the Supreme Court of California held that Ross 
did not have a cause of action under state discrimination laws because the use of 
marijuana remains illegal at the federal level.6 
Doctors can legally recommend medical marijuana to patients in states 
where medical marijuana is decriminalized.7 An increasing number of states are 
following California’s lead and are enacting legislation to legalize medical mari-
juana.8 As a result of these recent legislative changes, over one million people 
                                                                                                                           
 4 Id.; see also Cannabis and Cannabinoids, NAT’L CANCER INST., http://www.cancer.gov/
cancertopics/pdq/cam/cannabis/healthprofessional/page2 (last visited Oct. 5, 2014), archived at 
http://perma.cc/SPZ8-SRNB (explaining that the cannabis plant—i.e. marijuana—produces psychoac-
tive compounds called cannabinoids and tetrahydrocannabinol is the primary psychoactive ingredient 
in these cannabinoids). 
 5 Ross, 174 P.3d at 203. 
 6 Id. at 208. 
 7 Id. at 203; see 410 ILL. COMP. STAT. 130/5 (2013 & Supp. 2014) (“Cannabis has many currently 
accepted medical uses in the United States, having been recommended by thousands of licensed phy-
sicians to at least 600,000 patients in states with medical cannabis laws.”). 
 8 23 Legal Medical Marijuana States and DC: Laws, Fees, and Possession Limits, PROCON.ORG, 
http://medicalmarijuana.procon.org/view.resource.php?resourceID=000881, archived at http://perma.
cc/6UEP-H399 (last updated July 31, 2014). There are currently twenty-four jurisdictions that have 
enacted laws legalizing medical marijuana: Alaska, Arizona, California, Colorado, Connecticut, the 
District of Columbia, Delaware, Hawaii, Illinois, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan, Minne-
sota, Montana, Nevada, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New Mexico, New York, Oregon, Rhode Is-
land, Vermont, and Washington. COLO. CONST. art. XVIII, § 14 (2013); ALASKA STAT. 
§§ 17.37.010–.80 (2012); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 36-2801 to -2819 (2014) (West); CAL. HEALTH 
& SAFETY CODE §§ 11362.5–.83 (West 2007 & Supp. 2014); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 21a-408 (2013); 
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 16, §§ 4901A–4926A (West 2003 & Supp. 2012); D.C. CODE §§ 7-1671.01–.13 
(2013); HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 329-121 to -128 (LexisNexis 2013); 410 ILL. COMP. 
STAT.§ 130/1–999 (2013 & Supp. 2014); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, §§ 2421–2430-B (2004 & 
Supp. 2013); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 94C app., §§ 1-1 to -17 (West 2006 & Supp. 2014); MICH. 
COMP. LAWS ANN. §§ 333.26421–.26430 (West 2001 & Supp. 2014); MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 50-46-
301 to -344 (2013); NEV. REV. STAT. §§ 453A.010–.810 (2013); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 126-X:1–
:11 (2005 & Supp. 2013); N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 24:6I-1 to -15 (West 2007 & Supp. 2014); N.M. STAT. 
ANN. § 26-2B-1–7 (2007 & Supp. 2013); OR. REV. STAT. §§ 475.300–.346 (2013); R.I. GEN. LAWS 
§§ 21-28.6-1 to -13 (2002 & Supp. 2013); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, §§ 4472–4474m (2012 & Supp. 
2014); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §§ 69.51A.005–.903 (West 2007 & Supp. 2014). In 2014 alone, there 
were fourteen additional states with pending legislation to legalize medical marijuana: Florida, Kan-
sas, Kentucky, Maryland, Minnesota, Missouri, New York, North Carolina, Ohio, Pennsylvania, 
South Carolina, Tennessee, West Virginia, and Wisconsin. See 3 States with Pending Legislation to 
Legalize Medical Marijuana, PROCON.ORG, http://medicalmarijuana.procon.org/view.resource.php?
resourceID=002481, archived at http://perma.cc/6N5V-Q22Q (last updated Nov. 5, 2014). Three of 
these states, Maryland, Minnesota, and New York, passed legislation in 2014 to legalize medical ma-
rijuana. MD. CODE ANN., HEALTH–GEN. § 13-3301 to -3316 (LexisNexis 2009 & Supp. 2014); 2014 
Minn. Laws 2065; N.Y. PUB. HEALTH § 3360 (McKinney, Westlaw through L.2014, chapters 1 to 
422). 
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currently use medical marijuana, and this number continues to rise.9 Further-
more, there is increasing public support for legalizing medical marijuana.10 De-
spite this evolving legislative and social atmosphere, marijuana use—either for 
recreational or medical purposes—remains illegal under the federal Controlled 
Substances Act (“CSA”).11 
The facts surrounding Mr. Ross’s case highlight the inconsistency between 
state and federal marijuana laws that has led to uncertainty regarding the rights 
of employees to engage in state-sanctioned, off-duty use of medical marijuana.12 
Although states have passed medical marijuana laws to protect the health, safety, 
and welfare of their citizens,13 courts addressing the issue have thus far unani-
mously used federal law to deny employees any legal mechanism to extend this 
protection to medical marijuana use in the employment context.14 To date, the 
                                                                                                                           
 9 How Many People in the United States Use Medical Marijuana?, PROCON.ORG, http://medical
marijuana.procon.org/view.answers.php?questionID=001199, archived at http://perma.cc/LD8A-
S6AP (last updated Dec. 31, 2012); see California Medical Marijuana Identification Cards Data by 
County and Fiscal Year, CAL. DEP’T OF PUB. HEALTH, http://www.cdph.ca.gov/programs/MMP/
Documents/MMP%20County%20Card%20Count.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/MX6Z-HM5Q (last 
updated Mar. 15, 2014) (demonstrating that the number of medical marijuana identification cards issued 
between 2011 and 2014 was 17,667, as opposed to the eighty-five medical marijuana identification cards 
issued in 2004); Medical Marijuana Statistics, COLO. DEP’T OF PUB. HEALTH & ENV’T, http://
www.colorado.gov/cs/Satellite/CDPHE-CHEIS/CBON/1251593017044, archived at http://perma.cc/
3MBY-YAYH (last updated Nov. 2013) (showing that, as of November 2013, there were 110,785 
patients using medical marijuana in Colorado which was an approximate 80% increase from the 
21,625 patients in October 2009). 
 10 Gary Langer, High Support for Medical Marijuana, ABC NEWS (Jan. 18, 2010), http://abc
news.go.com/images/PollingUnit/1100a3MedicalMarijuana.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/D5DJ-
VM82. In a national survey conducted in 1997, 69% of Americans supported the legalization of medi-
cal marijuana. Id. In a similar study conducted in 2010, this number had risen to 81%. Id. In a 2014 
poll of New York voters, 88% supported the legalization of medical marijuana. New York Voters Back 
Medical Marijuana 10-1, Quinnipiac University Poll Finds Strong Support for Recreational Marijua-
na Also, QUINNIPIAC UNIV. POLLING INST. (Feb. 17, 2014), http://www.quinnipiac.edu/images/
polling/ny/ny02172014_b1s5tv.pdf/, archived at http://perma.cc/7MLF-H89C. Further, in a study 
conducted by the New England Journal of Medicine, 76% of doctors supported the use of medical 
marijuana  to help alleviate the symptoms of cancer. See Jonathan N. Adler & James A. Colbert, Me-
dicinal Use of Marijuana—Polling Results, 368 NEW ENG. J. MED. 30(1) (2013). 
 11 21 U.S.C. § 812(b)–(c) (2012). Under the Controlled Substances Act, marijuana is classified as 
a Schedule I controlled substance. Id. This is the most restrictive category and signifies Congress’s 
conclusion that marijuana has no medicinal value and cannot be legally prescribed. § 812(b)–(c); 
§ 829. 
 12 See Ross, 174 P.3d at 208. 
 13 See Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 42–43 (2005) (O’Connor, J., dissenting) (arguing that Cali-
fornia’s Compassionate Use Act is an exercise of a state’s traditional and core police powers to define 
criminal law and protect the health, safety, and welfare of its citizens); supra note 8 and accompany-
ing text (discussing that twenty-three states and the District of Columbia have passed state statutes 
legalizing medical marijuana use).  
 14 Casias v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 695 F.3d 428, 436–37 (6th Cir. 2012) (holding that the Michi-
gan Medical Marijuana Act does not restrict a private employer’s ability to discipline employees for 
medical marijuana use and, therefore, the Act could not support a wrongful termination claim); Ross, 
174 P.3d at 208 (holding that the California Fair Employment and Housing Act does not require an 
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U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, the Supreme Court of California, the 
Montana Supreme Court, the Washington Supreme Court, and the Colorado 
Court of Appeals have all dismissed employees’ claims for employment discrim-
ination and wrongful termination where the employee was terminated for medi-
cal marijuana use.15 As a result, medical marijuana patients are left with an im-
possible choice of either being able to pursue a career or suffer from chronic, 
debilitating pain.16 
This Note argues that, in states where medical marijuana use is legal, em-
ployees should be granted protections from employment discrimination under 
state law.17 Part I of this Note outlines the federal and state laws surrounding 
marijuana use and employment discrimination.18 Part II examines the arguments 
made by employees in cases involving medical marijuana employment discrimi-
nation claims.19 Further, Part II analyzes why employees’ claims have consist-
                                                                                                                           
employer to accommodate an employee who used medical marijuana and that an employee who is 
terminated for authorized medical marijuana use cannot state a cause of action for termination in vio-
lation of public policy); Coats v. Dish Network, L.L.C., 303 P.3d 147, 152 (Colo. App. 2013) (holding 
that state-licensed medical marijuana use is not a “lawful activity” under the Colorado employment 
discrimination law); Johnson v. Columbia Falls Aluminum Co. LLC, No. DA 08-0358, 2009 WL 
865308, at *4 (Mont. 2009) (holding that an employee who was terminated for use of medical mariju-
ana could not state a claim under the Montana Human Rights Act or the Americans with Disabilities 
Act); Emerald Steel Fabricators, Inc. v. Bureau of Labor & Indus., 230 P.3d 518, 536 (Or. 2010) 
(holding that the Oregon Medical Marijuana Act was preempted by the Federal Controlled Substances 
Act and, therefore, the employee’s use of medical marijuana was illegal and was not entitled to ac-
commodation); Roe v. TeleTech Customer Care Mgmt., 257 P.3d 586, 594–95 (Wash. 2011) (holding 
that the Washington State Medical Use of Marijuana Act does not proclaim sufficient public policy to 
support a cause of action for wrongful termination).  
 15 See supra note 14 and accompanying text (discussing court decisions regarding employment 
protections afforded to employees engaging in state-sanctioned medical marijuana use). 
 16 See GEN. ASSEMB. OF CONN., JUDICIARY COMM., J. FAVORABLE REP., File No. 605, Jan. Sess., 
at 3 (2011), http://www.cga.ct.gov/2011/JFR/S/2011SB-01015-R00JUD-JFR.htm, archived at http://
perma.cc/78N7-BMJD. A breast cancer survivor articulated this before the Connecticut legislature:  
I am currently pursuing a career in social work, and I know it is likely that I will be 
drug tested for any job opportunities . . . . I would be able to pass this test . . . if I was 
hung over from a sleep aid, taking a prescription painkiller, or even hung-over from 
drinking alcohol until the pain cannot be felt anymore. If I choose to smoke marijuana, 
I would be denied this employment opportunity. Please change our laws and let all of us 
live our lives pain free and in good standing. 
Id. In adopting its medical marijuana law, the Connecticut legislature made a point to statutorily pro-
tect patients from employment discrimination. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 21a-408p (2013) (“No em-
ployer may refuse to hire a person or may discharge, penalize or threaten an employee solely on the 
basis of such person’s or employee’s status as a qualifying patient . . . .”). Connecticut is among a 
minority of states, including Arizona, Delaware, Illinois, and Maine, to provide such statutory em-
ployment protections. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 36-2813 (2014) (West); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. 
§ 21a-408p (2013); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 16 § 4905A (West 2003 & Supp. 2012); 410 ILL. COMP. 
STAT.§ 130/40 (2013 & Supp. 2014); ME. REV. STAT. tit. 22, § 2423-E(2) (2004 & Supp. 2013). 
 17 See infra notes 171–217 and accompanying text. 
 18 See infra notes 23–113 and accompanying text. 
 19 See infra notes 114–170 and accompanying text. 
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ently failed, and why dissenting opinions have found merits to these claims 20 
Finally, Part III of this Note argues that employees who are terminated for their 
use of state-sanctioned medical marijuana should be afforded discrimination pro-
tection under state law.21 More specifically, Part III argues that courts should 
allow medical marijuana users to state claims for disability discrimination under 
state law and that state legislatures should amend their medical marijuana stat-
utes to explicitly provide a cause of action for medical marijuana patients who 
are discriminated against in the employment context.22 
I. THE HAZY LANDSCAPE OF MEDICAL MARIJUANA IN THE  
EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION CONTEXT 
Marijuana legislation and employment discrimination legislation exist at 
both the federal and state level.23 This Part outlines these laws in order to pro-
vide a better understanding of how state and federal law intersect in the context 
of a medical marijuana employment discrimination claim.24 Section A examines 
federal and state law regarding marijuana.25 Section B examines federal and 
state law regarding disability discrimination.26 
A. Federal Marijuana Legislation in the United States 
Laws regarding the regulation of marijuana use, possession, and cultivation 
are becoming increasingly inconsistent on the federal and state level.27 Subsec-
tion 1 explores federal marijuana laws.28 Subsection 2 explores state legislation 
regarding medical marijuana.29 Finally, Subsection 3 explores the relationship 
between these federal and state marijuana laws.30 
                                                                                                                           
 20 See infra notes 114–170 and accompanying text. 
 21 See infra notes 171–217 and accompanying text. 
 22 See infra notes 171–217 and accompanying text. 
 23 See infra notes 27–113 and accompanying text. 
24 See infra notes 27–113 and accompanying text. 
25 See infra notes 27–76 and accompanying text. 
 26 See infra notes 77–113 and accompanying text. 
27 Compare 21 U.S.C. § 812 (b)–(c) (2012) (stating that marijuana has no known medical 
use and is illegal under federal law), with, e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 17.37.030 (2012) (providing an 
affirmative defense to arrest, prosecution, or penalty under state law for medical marijuana 
users), and CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 11362.5(b)(1)(B) (West 2007 & Supp. 2014) 
(providing an affirmative defense to state criminal prosecution or sanction for medical mari-
juana users). 
28 See infra notes 31–43 and accompanying text. 
29 See infra notes 44–56 and accompanying text. 
30 See infra notes 57–76 and accompanying text. 
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1. Federal Marijuana Laws in the United States 
In 1970, Congress passed the Controlled Substances Act, or CSA.31 This 
was the United States’ first comprehensive drug control statute, enacted to over-
haul the “inadequate and outdated” drug laws.32 The main purpose of the CSA 
was to conquer drug abuse and to control the legitimate and illegitimate traffic in 
controlled substances.33 To effectuate this purpose, Congress devised a regulato-
ry scheme making it unlawful to manufacture, distribute, dispense, or possess 
any controlled substance except as authorized by the CSA.34 
The CSA categorizes controlled substances into one of five schedules ac-
cording to their abuse potential, known effect, harmfulness, and medicinal val-
ue.35 Schedule I is the most restrictive category and requires findings that the 
drug has (1) a high potential for abuse, (2) no accepted medical use, and (3) no 
accepted safety for use in medically supervised treatment.36 Marijuana is placed 
in this most restrictive category, along with drugs such as heroin, lysergic acid 
diethylamide (LSD), and methlylenedioxymethamphetamine (ecstasy).37 In con-
trast to Schedule II–V drugs, federal law does not permit individuals to legally 
obtain a prescription to use Schedule I drugs for personal medical use.38 The 
CSA’s categorizations reflect Congress’s conclusion that marijuana lacks a 
                                                                                                                           
 31 See Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-513, 84 
Stat. 1236 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 21 U.S.C.). The CSA constitutes Title II of 
the Comprehensive Drug Abuse and Prevention and Control Act. See id. The CSA provides a statuto-
ry framework for the federal government to regulate the lawful production, possession, and distribu-
tion of controlled substances. See BRIAN T. YEH, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL34635, THE CON-
TROLLED SUBSTANCES ACT: REGULATORY REQUIREMENTS 1 (2012). 
 32 See Letter from President Richard Nixon to Congress (July 14, 1969), available at http://www.
presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=2126, archived at http://perma.cc/K5PA-CZBN. Prior to the passing of 
the CSA, the only congressional effort to control marijuana use was the Marihuana Tax Act of 1937. 
Marihuana Tax Act of 1937, ch. 553, 50 Stat. 551 (repealed 1970); see Andrew J. LeVay, Note, Ur-
gent Compassion: Medical Marijuana, Prosecutorial Discretion and the Medical Necessity Defense, 
41 B.C. L. REV. 699, 702–03 (2000) (explaining that under the 1937 Act, people using marijuana for 
any purpose were required to register and pay a tax). 
 33 H.R. REP. NO. 91-1444, at 3–5 (1970). Specifically, the CSA sought to provide (1) drug abuse 
prevention and rehabilitation of users, (2) more effective means for law enforcement to control and 
prevent drug abuse, and (3) a balanced scheme of criminal penalties for offenses involving drugs. 
Raich, 545 U.S. at 12–13. 
 34 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1), 844(a) (2012). One such authorization that the CSA provides is allow-
ing licensed medical practitioners to prescribe controlled substances listed in Schedules II–V to pa-
tients. See 21 C.F.R. §§ 1306.11, 1306.21 (2014) (explaining the prescription requirements for Sched-
ule II–V drugs). 
 35 21 U.S.C. §§ 811(c), 812. 
 36 §§ 812(b)(1), 812(c). 
 37 § 812(c). Examples of drugs placed in the less restrictive Schedule II category include cocaine, 
morphine, opium, and ocycodone. Id. 
 38 See § 829(a)–(c); Ams. for Safe Access v. Drug Enforcement Admin., 706 F.3d 438, 441 (D.C. 
Cir.), cert. denied, 134 S. Ct. 267 (2013). 
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medical use or purpose and, therefore, practitioners should not be authorized to 
legally prescribe it to patients.39 
Although there is evidence suggesting that Congress intended marijuana to 
be classified as a Schedule I controlled substance only temporarily, marijuana 
still remains a Schedule I controlled substance.40 Nonetheless, since 1972 there 
have been several unsuccessful petitions to reschedule marijuana.41 Recently, on 
                                                                                                                           
 39 § 812(b); Emerald Steel Fabricators, 230 P.3d at 528; see Erik R. Neusch, Comment, Medical 
Marijuana’s Fate in the Aftermath of the Supreme Court’s New Commerce Clause Jurisprudence, 72 
U. COLO. L. REV. 201, 210 (2001) (“Because of marijuana’s status as a Schedule I drug, physicians 
who recommend, and patients who use, marijuana in accordance with state law can be held criminally 
liable under federal law.”). 
 40 RICHARD J. BONNIE & CHARLES H. WHITEBREAD II, THE MARIJUANA CONVICTION: A HIS-
TORY OF MARIJUANA PROHIBITION IN THE UNITED STATES 246 (1999) (describing how members of 
Congress anticipated that marijuana’s Schedule I status would soon change given the uncertainty that 
surrounded experts’ discussion about the effects of marijuana); see also H.R. REP. NO. 91-1444, at 12 
(1970) (“The extent to which marijuana should be controlled is a subject upon which opinions diverge 
widely.”). After placing marijuana in Schedule I, Congress convened a Commission on Marihuana 
and Drug Abuse to aid in resolving the issue of marijuana’s medicinal value. See 21 U.S.C. § 812(c); 
Brief for Petitioner at 11, Ams. for Safe Access v. Drug Enforcement Admin., 706 F.3d 438 (D.C. Cir. 
2013) (No. 11-1265), 2012 WL 250752, at *11. On March 22, 1972, the Commission recommended 
that marijuana be decriminalized for personal use. Brief for Petitioner, supra at 12. Nonetheless, nei-
ther Congress nor the Nixon administration revisited the issue of rescheduling marijuana. 21 U.S.C. 
§ 812(c). Some argue that this was an oversight due to the distractions brought by the Watergate 
Scandal. See LeVay, supra note 32, at 703–04. There is evidence, however, that Nixon’s desire to 
keep marijuana classified as a Schedule I drug was an important component to his “War on Drugs” 
campaign. See Interview with Dr. Robert DuPont, FRONTLINE, http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/
frontline/shows/drugs/interviews/dupont.html, archived at http://perma.cc/A5GF-QJGP (last visited 
Nov. 7, 2014). Dr. Robert DuPont, the former head of the Special Action Office of Drug Abuse Pre-
vention, stated that when he came to the White House, President Nixon said, “You’re the drug expert, 
not me, on every issue but one, and that’s decriminalization of marijuana. If you make any hint of 
supporting decriminalization, you are history.” Id. 
 41 LeVay, supra note 32, at 704. The first petition occurred in 1972 when the National Organiza-
tion for the Reform of Marijuana Laws (NORML) unsuccessfully petitioned the Bureau of Narcotics 
and Dangerous Drugs (now the Drug Enforcement Agency) to reschedule marijuana as a Schedule II 
drug. See id. On September 6, 1988, the DEA’s Chief Administrative Law Judge, Judge Francis L. 
Young, concluded that “the provisions of the [CSA] permit and require transfer of marijuana from 
Schedule I to Schedule II” because marijuana is one of the “safest therapeutically active substances 
known to man.” Marijuana Rescheduling Petition, No. 86-22, at 58–59, 67 (Drug Enforcement Agen-
cy Sept. 6, 1988). In 1992, Robert Bonner, the DEA administrator, rejected Judge Young’s recom-
mendation to reschedule marijuana, creating a new five-part analysis for determining whether a sub-
stance has a currently accepted medical use. Marijuana Scheduling Petition; Denial of Petition; Re-
mand, 57 Fed. Reg. 10499-02, 10503 (Mar. 26, 1992) (finding that the evidence relied upon by Judge 
Young that marijuana is medicinal were “false, dangerous, and cruel”). Bonner applied a five-part test 
to asses whether marijuana has a currently accepted medical use, requiring that: (1) the drug’s chemis-
try must be known and reproducible; (2) there are adequate safety studies; (3) there are adequate and 
well-controlled studies proving efficacy; (4) the drug is accepted by qualified experts; and (5) the 
scientific evidence is widely available. See id. at 10504–06. On February 18, 1994, the Court of Ap-
peals for the District of Columbia upheld the DEA administrator’s categorization of marijuana as a 
Schedule I drug. See Alliance for Cannabis Therapeutics v. Drug Enforcement Admin., 15 F.3d 1131, 
1133 (D.C. Cir. 1994). A second unsuccessful petition to reschedule marijuana was filed on October 
9, 2002, by the Coalition to Reschedule Cannabis. Ams. for Safe Access, 706 F.3d at 441–42. On June 
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February 14, 2013, H.R. 689 was introduced to Congress to provide for the re-
scheduling of marijuana.42 After over forty decades of unsuccessful attempts to 
reschedule marijuana, the CSA maintains that there is no valid medical purpose 
for marijuana.43 
2. State Medical Marijuana Legislation  
Although medical marijuana remains illegal under federal law, twenty-three 
states along with the District of Columbia have enacted legislation legalizing the 
use of medical marijuana.44 This proliferation of medical marijuana legislation at 
the state level illustrates the rising public support for the use of medical marijua-
na.45 Moreover, the state legislation demonstrates that states are exercising their 
traditional police power to “protect the health, safety, and welfare of their citi-
zens.”46 
Given that the purpose of the state medical marijuana laws is largely to pro-
tect the health, safety, and welfare of medical marijuana users, these states have 
found that marijuana provides a legitimate therapeutic remedy.47 Although the 
                                                                                                                           
21, 2011, the DEA denied this petition and, on January 22, 2012, the Court of Appeals for the District 
of Columbia upheld the DEA’s decision, reasoning that marijuana does not have a currently accepted 
medical use because there are not adequate and well-controlled studies proving efficacy. Id. at 442. 
 42 H.R. 689, 113th Cong. (2013). The prognosis for this bill states that it only has a one percent 
chance of being enacted. See H.R. 689: States’ Medical Marijuana Patient Protection Act, 
GOVTRACK.US, https://www.govtrack.us/congress/bills/113/hr689, archived at http://perma.cc/HS3S-
ARTX (last visited Oct. 7, 2014). If passed, this bill provides that within 180 days of its enactment, 
the Secretary of Health and Human Services shall recommend to the administrator of the DEA that 
marijuana be listed as a Schedule III substance under the CSA. H.R. 689 § 2(a)(1). 
 43 See 21 U.S.C. § 812(c). 
 44 See supra note 8 (listing the legislation legalizing medical marijuana in these twenty-four juris-
dictions). 
 45 See Adler & Colbert, supra note 10, at 30(1) (describing that seventy-six percent of polled 
doctors supported the use of medical marijuana to alleviate symptoms of cancer); Langer, supra note 
10 (describing a twelve percent increase in support for legalizing medical marijuana between 1997 
and 2010).  
 46 Raich, 545 U.S. at 42–43 (O’Connor, J., dissenting) (arguing that the CSA encroaches on 
states’ traditional police powers to define criminal law and to protect the health, safety, and welfare of 
their citizens). Many states explicitly express that the purpose of the medical marijuana legislation is 
to protect the health, safety, and welfare of their citizens. See, e.g., 410 ILL. COMP. STAT. § 130/5(e) 
(2013 & Supp. 2014) (“Illinois joins in this effort for the health and welfare of its citizens.”) (empha-
sis added); MONT. CODE ANN. § 50-46-301 (2013) (“The purpose of this part is to . . . give local gov-
ernments a role in establishing standards for the cultivation, manufacture, and use of marijuana that 
protect the public health, safety, and welfare of residents within their jurisdictions.”) (emphasis add-
ed); N.J. STAT. ANN. 24:6I-2 (West 2007 & Supp. 2014) (“New Jersey joins this effort for the health 
and welfare of its citizens.”) (emphasis added). 
 47 See e.g., 410 ILL. COMP. STAT. § 130/5(c) (“The medical utility of cannabis is recognized by a 
wide range of medical and public health organizations, including the American Academy of HIV 
Medicine, the American College of Physicians, the American Nurses Association, the American Pub-
lic Health Association, the Leukemia & Lymphoma Society, and many others.”); MICH. COMP. LAWS 
ANN. § 333.26422(a) (West 2001 & Supp. 2014) (“Modern medical research, including as found by 
the National Academy of Sciences’ Institute of Medicine in a March 1999 report, has discovered ben-
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use of medical marijuana dates back millennia,48 the CSA maintains that mariju-
ana provides no medicinal value.49 This is in contrast to a 1997 study by the Na-
tional Academy of Sciences’ Institute of Medicine, which concluded that there 
are beneficial uses of marijuana for relieving pain and treating medical condi-
tions such as “chemotherapy-induced nausea and vomiting and AIDS wast-
ing.”50 Although there are still concerns about the potential harmful effects of 
marijuana, state legislatures justify medical marijuana laws based on findings 
that medical marijuana can be used to provide relief for conditions such as ca-
chexia, cancer, glaucoma, AIDS, nausea, post-traumatic stress syndrome, severe 
pain, seizures, persistent muscle spasms, and multiple sclerosis. 51 
                                                                                                                           
eficial uses for marihuana in treating or alleviating the pain, nausea, and other symptoms associated 
with a variety of debilitating medical conditions.”); N.J. STAT. ANN. 24:6I-2 (“Modern medical re-
search has discovered a beneficial use for marijuana in treating or alleviating the pain or other symp-
toms associated with certain debilitating medical conditions, as found by the National Academy of 
Sciences’ Institute of Medicine in March 1999.”); see also infra note 50 and accompanying text (dis-
cussing the 1997 study by the National Academy of Sciences). 
 48 Annaliese Smith, Comment, Marijuana as a Schedule I Substance: Political Ploy or Accepted 
Science?, 40 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 1137, 1139–40 (2000). A Chinese treatise on pharmacology 
dated 2737 B.C.E. is the earliest known reference to marijuana. Id. In the United States during the 
nineteenth century, pharmacologists recommended marijuana for its analgesic properties and marijua-
na became a popular medicinal drug. Id. From 1850 to 1941, marijuana was included in the United 
States Pharmacopoeia as a recognized medicinal drug. MARK EDDY, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., 
RL33211, MEDICAL MARIJUANA: REVIEW AND ANALYSIS OF FEDERAL AND STATE POLICIES 1 
(2010), available at https://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/RL33211.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/825F-
Q8H7. The popularity of medical marijuana was dampened with the passage of the Marihuana Tax 
Act of 1937. See Marihuana Tax Act of 1937, ch. 553, 50 Stat. 551 (1937) (repealed 1970). Although 
this act was intended to prevent non-medical use of marijuana, it made obtaining marijuana difficult 
and thus resulted in marijuana’s removal from the U.S. Pharmacopoeia. LeVay, supra note 32, at 702. 
Legislative counsel for the American Medical Association opposed the tax act, testifying that “it may 
serve to deprive the public of the benefits of a drug that on further research may prove be of substan-
tial value.” EDDY, supra at 2. 
 49 See 21 U.S.C. § 812(b) (2012); see also supra notes 31–43 and accompanying text (discussing 
the federal policy on marijuana). 
 50 See INST. OF MED., MARIJUANA AND MEDICINE: ASSESSING THE SCIENCE BASE 4, (Janet Joy 
et al., eds. 2003) (finding that cannabis reduces neuropathic pain, improves appetite and caloric intake 
especially in patients with reduced muscle mass, and may relieve pain for patients with multiple scle-
rosis). In 1997, the White House Office of National Drug Control Policy asked the Institute of Medi-
cine to conduct this study in response to the enactment of the California Compassionate Use Act of 
1996. Id. at 2. 
 51 Oregon Medical Marijuana Program Statistics, OR. HEALTH AUTH., https://public.health.
oregon.gov/diseasesconditions/chronicdisease/medicalmarijuanaprogram/pages/data.aspx, archived at 
http://perma.cc/94X6-WSXD (last updated Oct. 1, 2014). There are documented adverse side effects 
that may result from using marijuana, including rapid heat beats, low blood pressure, muscle relaxa-
tion, bloodshot eyes, slowed digestion, dizziness, depression, hallucinations, paranoia, and loss of 
lung function. See Questions and Answers About Cannabis, NAT’L CANCER INST., http://www.cancer.
gov/cancertopics/pdq/cam/cannabis/patient/page2, archived at http://perma.cc/5TXR-N5VK (last 
updated Mar. 25, 2014). The National Cancer Institute has recently initiated new clinical trials to test 
the effect of cannabis on the cognitive function of cancer patients. See Clinical Trials (PDQ®), NAT’L 
CANCER INST., http://www.cancer.gov/clinicaltrials/search/view?cdrid=754778&version=Patient&
protocolsearchid=9089288, archived at http://perma.cc/AC6J-HYEU (last updated Sept. 18, 2014). 
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In addition to sharing a common purpose, the twenty-four enacted medical 
marijuana statutes provide a common remedy.52 The statutes permit residents to 
possess, consume, or cultivate marijuana without state criminal prosecution by 
obtaining a qualifying diagnosis and recommendation from a board-licensed 
physician.53 A few states explicitly provide an affirmative defense for medical 
marijuana patients facing criminal prosecution.54 Alternatively, many statutes 
have broader protections, stating that medical marijuana patients are not to be 
subject to “penalty,” “sanction,” or may not be “denied any right or privilege.”55 
Furthermore, several states explicitly extend protections to the employment con-
text, precluding employers from discriminating against an employee in hiring or 
termination if the discrimination is based on a medical marijuana patient’s posi-
tive drug test.56 
3. The Interaction Between Federal and State Marijuana Legislation 
Marijuana legislation raises a critical preemption issue.57 At the state level, 
there some are laws that permit the use of marijuana for medical purposes.58 
Conversely, at the federal level, the use of medical marijuana is prohibited.59 In 
turn, if the federal statute preempts the state medical marijuana laws, then the 
state law would be without effect.60 Federal preemption of state law is grounded 
                                                                                                                           
 52 See supra note 8 (listing the twenty-four medical marijuana statutes). 
 53 See supra note 8 (listing the twenty-four medical marijuana statutes). 
 54 See COLO. CONST. art. XVIII, § 14 (2013); D.C. CODE § 7-1671.08 (2013); HAW. REV. STAT. 
§ 329-125 (LexisNexis 2013); NEV. REV. STAT. § 453A.200 (2013); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 4474b 
(2012 & Supp. 2014). 
 55 See ALASKA STAT. § 17.37.030 (2012); CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 11362.5(b)(1)(B) 
(West 2007 & Supp. 2014); MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 94C app., § 1-4 (West 2006 & Supp. 2014); MICH. 
COMP. LAWS ANN. § 333.26424 (West 2001 & Supp. 2014); MONT. CODE ANN. § 50-46-319 (2013); 
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 24:6I-2 (West 2007 & Supp. 2014); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 26-2B-4 (2007 & Supp. 
2013); OR. REV. STAT. § 475.300 (2013); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 21-28.6-4 (2002 & Supp. 2013); WASH. 
REV. CODE § 69.51A.040 (West 2007 & Supp. 2014). 
 56 See ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 36-2813 (2014) (West); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 21a-408p (2013); 
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 16 § 4903A (West 2003 & Supp. 2012); 410 ILL. COMP. STAT. § 130/40 (2013 & 
Supp. 2014); ME. REV. STAT. tit. 22, § 2423-E(2) (2004 & Supp. 2013); 2014 Minn. Laws 2065. 
 57 See Stacy A. Hickox, Clearing the Smoke on Medical Marijuana Users in the Workplace, 29 
QUINNIPIAC L. REV. 1001, 1041 (2011); see also Raich, 545 U.S. at 42 (O’Connor, J., dissenting) 
(“One of federalism’s chief virtues, of course, is that it promotes innovation by allowing for the possi-
bility that ‘a single courageous State may, if its citizens choose, serve as a laboratory; and try novel 
social and economic experiments without risk to the rest of the country.’” (quoting New State Ice Co. 
v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J. dissenting))). 
 58 See supra note 8 and accompanying text (listing the statutes that have legalized medical mari-
juana). 
 59 21 U.S.C. § 812(b)–(c) (2012). 
 60 See U.S. CONST. art VI, § 2 (“This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall 
be made in Pursuance thereof . . . shall be the supreme Law of the Land.”); Maryland v. Louisiana, 
451 U.S. 725, 746 (1981) (reasoning that the Supremacy Clause demands that all state provisions in 
conflict with federal law be without effect). 
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in the Supremacy Clause of the U.S. Constitution, which invalidates state laws 
that interfere with, or are contrary to, federal law.61 There are three types of 
preemption analysis: express preemption, field preemption, and implied conflict 
preemption.62 Under each type of analysis, the focus is congressional intent.63 
Notably, in passing the CSA, it was not Congress’s intent to “occupy the 
field” of drug legislation.64 Instead, Congress expressly gave states the authority 
to pass their own drug laws so long as there is “no positive conflict between [the 
CSA] and the State law so that the two cannot consistently stand together.”65 
Because Congress wrote this savings clause into the CSA giving states the au-
thority to enact legislation regulating controlled substances, neither express nor 
field preemption is applicable.66 Therefore, courts have applied implied conflict 
preemption analysis to determine whether there is a positive conflict between the 
CSA and state medical marijuana laws.67 Implied conflict preemption requires 
either (1) that it is impossible for an entity to comply with both federal and state 
law or (2) that the state law stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment and 
execution of the full purposes and objectives of the congressional act.68 Apply-
                                                                                                                           
 61 U.S. CONST. art VI, § 2. 
 62 See Arizona v. United States, 132 S. Ct. 2492, 2501 (2012) (explaining that (1) states cannot 
regulate in a field that Congress has determined to be regulated by its exclusive governance, (2) Con-
gress may withdraw specific powers from the states by enacting statutes with express preemption 
clauses, and (3) states laws are preempted when they conflict with federal law). 
 63 Wyeth v. Levine, 555 U.S. 555, 565 (2009) (discussing that “the purpose of Congress is the 
touchstone in every pre-emption case”). 
 64 21 U.S.C. § 903 (2012). 
 65 Id. 
 66 Arizona, 132 S. Ct. at 2501. Express preemption applies in situations where Congress has writ-
ten into the statute that states cannot enforce legislation in that particular area. Id. Field preemption 
applies in situations where the scheme of federal regulation is so comprehensive that it is reasonable 
that Congress left no room for states to supplement the law, or where the federal statutes touch on a 
field where the federal interests are dominant. Id. 
 67 See, e.g., Wyeth, 555 U.S. at 563–64 (applying implied conflict preemption analysis by examin-
ing whether an actual conflict between state failure-to-warn laws and federal FDA requirements exist-
ed, either because it is physically impossible to comply with both state and federal law or because the 
state law stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and objec-
tives of Congress); Beek v. City of Wyoming, 846 N.W.2d 531, 537 (Mich. 2014) (applying the same 
implied conflict preemption analysis as articulated in Wyeth v. Levine in considering whether the CSA 
preempts the Michigan Medical Marijuana Act); Emerald Steel Fabricators, 230 P.3d at 528 (apply-
ing the same implied conflict preemption analysis as articulated in Wyeth in considering whether the 
CSA preempts the Oregon Medical Marijuana Act). 
 68 Wyeth, 555 U.S. at 563. First, regarding impossibility preemption, the U.S. Supreme Court has 
held that it is not physically impossible to comply with logically inconsistent statutes when a person 
can simply refrain from doing the activity that one statute purports to authorize and the other statute 
purports to proscribe. Barnett Bank v. Nelson, 517 U.S. 25, 31 (1996). Second, an obstacle conflict 
preemption analysis involves three inquiries: (1) what is the purpose of the federal law?; (2) how do 
we tell that purpose?; and (3) is there a presumption against preemption because the laws involve an 
area historically governed by state police powers? See Wyeth, 555 U.S. at 565. Finally, to determine 
whether a state statute stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment of the full purposes and objectives 
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ing this analysis, courts are divided regarding whether the CSA preempts state 
medical marijuana statutes.69 
In addition to these judicial decisions regarding the relationship between 
federal and state marijuana laws, the U.S. Department of Justice has commented 
three times on this conflict of law.70 On October 19, 2009, David W. Ogden, 
Deputy Attorney General, issued a memorandum articulating a policy that urged 
federal prosecutors not to enforce the federal marijuana ban against persons who 
act in clear and unambiguous compliance with state medical marijuana laws.71 In 
                                                                                                                           
of Congress, the purposes and objectives of the state statute at issue must also be identified. Fla. Lime 
& Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132, 144–46 (1963). 
 69 Compare, e.g., Cnty. of San Diego v. San Diego NORML, 81 Cal. Rptr. 3d 461, 483 (Cal. Dist. 
Ct. App. 2008) (holding that there is no obstacle preemption in regards to state medical marijuana 
statute), People v. Crouse, No. 12-CA-2298, 2013 WL 6673708, at * 9 (Colo. App. Dec. 19, 2013) 
(same), and Beek 846 N.W.2d at 534 (same), with Haeberle v. Lowden, No. 2011-CV-709, 2012 WL 
7149098, at *3–4 (D. Colo. Aug. 8, 2012) (striking down state marijuana statute due to obstacle 
preemption), and Emerald Steel Fabricators, 230 P.3d at 536 (same). Although courts are divided 
regarding obstacle preemption, they all rely on the reasoning of the U.S. Supreme Court to hold that 
the CSA does not preempt the state laws since it is possible to comply with both federal and state law 
because individuals can refrain from general marijuana use. See Beek, 846 N.W.2d at 537. The CSA 
and state medical marijuana statutes are, however, logically inconsistent: on the one hand, the CSA 
prohibits any use of marijuana, medical or otherwise, while, on the other hand, state medical marijua-
na statutes authorize—but do not mandate—use of medical marijuana. Compare 21 U.S.C. § 812(b)–
(c) (2012) (stating that marijuana has no known medical use and is illegal under federal law), with, 
e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 17.37.030 (2012) (providing an affirmative defense to arrest, prosecution, or 
penalty under state law for medical marijuana users), and CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE 
§ 11362.5(b)(1)(B) (West 2007 & Supp. 2014) (providing an affirmative defense to state criminal 
prosecution or sanctions for medical marijuana users). In Beek, the Michigan Supreme Court held that 
the Michigan Medical Marijuana Act is not preempted by the CSA on the basis of impossibility 
preemption. 846 N.W.2d at 537. The court reasoned that because the Michigan Medical Marijuana 
Act does not mandate the use of medical marijuana, it is not physically impossible to comply with 
both the Michigan Medical Marijuana Act and the CSA simultaneously. Id. 
 70 See Memorandum from James M. Cole, Deputy Attorney General, on Guidance Regarding 
Marijuana Enforcement to All U.S. Attorneys (Aug. 29, 2013), available at http://www.justice.gov/
iso/opa/resources/3052013829132756857467.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/SL4F-799L [hereinafter 
Cole 2013 Memorandum]; Memorandum from James M. Cole, Deputy Attorney General, on Guid-
ance Regarding the Ogden Memo n Jurisdictions Seeking to Authorize Marijuana for Medical Use to 
U.S. Attorneys (June 29, 2011), available at http://www.justice.gov/oip/docs/dag-guidance-2011-for-
medical-marijuana-use.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/K3JE-2JK9 [hereinafter Cole 2011 Memoran-
dum]; Memorandum from David W. Ogden, Deputy Attorney General, on Investigations and Prosecu-
tions in States Authorizing the Medical Use of Marijuana to Selected U.S. Attorneys (Oct. 19, 2009), 
available at http://www.justice.gov/opa/documents/medical-marijuana.pdf, archived at http://perma.
cc/E9K5-4YFT [hereinafter Ogden Memorandum]. 
 71 See Ogden Memorandum, supra note 70, at 2. This memorandum explained that it is not an 
efficient use of federal resources to prosecute patients or caregivers who use or administer medical 
marijuana according to a treatment regiment consistent with state law. See id. Pursuant to the Ogden 
Memorandum, states were able to experiment with laws legalizing medical marijuana without being 
concerned that patients or caregivers would be federally prosecuted. See id. This policy reflected the 
reasoning of Justice Stevens’ concurring opinion in United States v. Oakland Cannabis Buyers’ Co-
operative. See 532 U.S. 483, 502 (2001) (Stevens, J., concurring) (arguing that there is a duty on fed-
eral courts to minimize conflict between federal and state law, and that states should be permitted to 
serve as laboratories); see also New State Ice Co., 285 U.S. at 311 (“It is one of the happy incidents of 
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contrast, on January 29, 2011, James M. Cole, Deputy Attorney General, re-
leased a memorandum in response to “an increase in the scope of commercial 
cultivation, sale, distribution and use of marijuana for purported medical purpos-
es.”72 The Cole memorandum stressed that those involved in the cultivation, dis-
tribution, sale, or use of medical marijuana are not shielded from federal crimi-
nal prosecution, and gave federal prosecutors the discretion to prosecute such 
persons if such actions are consistent with resource constraints. 73 In response to 
increased state legislation legalizing marijuana—both medicinal and recreation-
al—on August 29, 2013 Cole released a second memorandum concluding that, 
in circumstances where states have legalized marijuana in some form and have 
implemented effective regulatory measures, “enforcement of state law by state 
and local law enforcement and regulatory bodies should remain the primary 
means of addressing marijuana-related activity.”74 
In sum, there is some agreement among the courts and federal executive 
branch that federal and state marijuana laws can coexist.75 Nevertheless, some 
courts still hold that the CSA preempts state medical marijuana laws, and the 
federal government maintains that state-sanctioned medical marijuana use can be 
federally prosecuted.76 
                                                                                                                           
the federal system that a single courageous state may, if its citizens choose, serve as a laboratory; and 
try novel social and economic experiments without risk to the rest of the country.”). 
 72 See Cole 2011 Memorandum, supra note 70, at 1–2. The Cole 2011 Memorandum focused 
only on the cultivators of marijuana because, like the Ogden Memorandum, it explained that it is not 
an efficient use of federal resources to prosecute patients or caregivers who use or administer medical 
marijuana according to a treatment regiment consistent with state law. See [Cole 2011 Memorandum, 
supra note 70], at 1; Ogden Memorandum, supra note 70, at 2. 
 73 See Cole 2011 Memorandum, supra note 70, at 2.  
74 See Cole 2013 Memorandum, supra note 70, at 3. This memorandum explains that “the 
federal government has traditionally relied on state and local law enforcement agencies to 
address marijuana activity through enforcement of their own narcotics laws.” See id. at 2. (emphasis 
added). This memorandum explains that the Department of Justice only has stepped in to 
enforce the CSA when marijuana activity has threatened enumerated harms. See id. (explain-
ing these harms to be: preventing the distribution of marijuana to minors; preventing revenue 
from the sale of marijuana from going to gangs and cartels; preventing the diversion of mari-
juana from states where it is legal under state law in some form to other states; preventing 
state-authorized marijuana activity from being used as a cover or pretext for trafficking of 
other illegal drugs or other illegal activity; preventing violence and the use of firearms in the 
cultivation of marijuana; preventing drugged driving and the exacerbation of other adverse 
public health consequences associated with marijuana use; preventing the growing of mariju-
ana on public lands and the environmental dangers posed by marijuana production; prevent-
ing marijuana possession or use on federal property). Notably, medical marijuana use in the 
employment context is absent from that list of enumerated harms. See id. at 1–2. 
 75 See Qualified Patients Ass’n v. City of Anaheim, 115 Cal. Rptr.3d 89, 110 (Cal. Ct. App. 
2010); Crouse, 2013 WL 6673708, at *9; Beek, 846 N.W.2d at 534; Cole 2013 Memorandum, supra 
note 70, at 1. Currently there is proposed legislation in the U.S. House of Representatives that would 
amend the CSA to not preempt state law. See H.R. 964, 113th Cong. (2013). This proposed legislation 
has a “Special Rule Regarding State Marijuana Laws” that explicitly states that no provision of the 
CSA shall preempt such state laws. See id. 
 76 See Emerald Steel Fabricators, 230 P.3d at 536; Cole 2013 Memorandum, supra note 70, at 1. 
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B. Employment Discrimination Protections in the United States 
Patients using medical marijuana for therapeutic purposes likely suffer 
from disabilities that qualify them as members of a protected class under either 
federal or state disability discrimination laws.77 For instance, in 2008 in Ross v. 
RagingWire Telecommunications, Inc., the Supreme Court of California held that 
the plaintiff was a qualified individual with a disability due to his back injuries.78 
Subsection 1 explores federal disability discrimination laws.79 Subsection 2 ex-
plores disability discrimination laws at the state level.80 Finally, Subsection 3 
explores the relationship and interaction of these federal and state disability dis-
crimination protections.81 
1. Federal Disability Discrimination Law 
Title I of the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 (“ADA”) protects 
employees from disability discrimination.82 Congress enacted the ADA because 
it recognized that people with handicaps or disabilities often face barriers such as 
prejudice, stereotypes, and discrimination.83 The ADA gives employees and job 
applicants the right to bring suit against covered employers who discriminate 
against individuals who are otherwise qualified for a particular job.84 This dis-
crimination includes employer actions that are based not only on the disabilities 
themselves but also on symptoms of, or mitigating measures used for, a disabil-
ity.85 To establish a prima facie case of disability discrimination under the ADA, 
plaintiffs must show that they are: (1) disabled within the meaning of the ADA; 
(2) qualified, with or without “reasonable accommodation,” to perform the es-
                                                                                                                           
 77 See supra note 51 and accompanying text (discussing the medical conditions of medical mari-
juana users). 
 78 174 P.3d at 203 (explaining that the plaintiff received government disability benefits for his 
pain injuries). 
79 See infra notes 82–92 and accompanying text. 
80 See infra notes 93–107 and accompanying text. 
81 See infra notes 108–113 and accompanying text. 
 82 Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 12111–12117 (2012). 
 83 See § 12112(a)–(b) (explaining that no employer shall discriminate against any “qualified indi-
vidual on the basis of disability in regard to job application procedures, the hiring, advancement, or 
discharge of employees, employee compensation, job training, and other terms, conditions, and privi-
leges of employment”); Elisa Y. Lee, Note, An American Way of Life: Prescription Drug Use in the 
Modern ADA Workplace, 45 COLUM. J.L. & SOC. PROBS. 303, 306 (2011) (explaining that the ADA 
recognizes that people with disabilities need enhanced protection in the employment context due to 
misconceptions that employers might have about the potential job performance and safety risks of 
disabled employees). 
 84 §§ 12111(8), 12112. Covered employers under the ADA include those employers who are 
“engaged in an industry affecting commerce who has 15 or more employees.” § 12111(5)(A). Covered 
employers do not include “the United States [or] a corporation wholly owned by the government of 
the United States.” § 12111(5)(B). Individuals are “qualified” if they can, with or without reasonable 
accommodation, perform the essential functions of the employment. § 12111(8). 
 85 See § 12112; Lee, supra note 83, at 306. 
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sential functions of the job at issue; and (3) have suffered an adverse employ-
ment decision because of the disability.86 Additionally, plaintiffs must also over-
come any “direct threat” defense that the employer raises.87 
The ADA recognizes an important exception to disability protection for us-
ers of illegal drugs.88 Under the ADA, “a qualified individual with a disability 
shall not include any employee or applicant who is currently engaging in the 
illegal use of drugs.”89 The ADA defines “illegal use of drugs” as the use of 
drugs that is unlawful under the CSA, excluding any drug use under medical 
supervision.90 Federal courts have construed medical marijuana use to be an ille-
gal use of drugs under the ADA.91 Therefore, the ADA provides no disability 
discrimination protection for medical marijuana patients who are terminated be-
cause of their drug use.92 
                                                                                                                           
 86 §§ 12102(2), 12111(a), 12112(b); see Cravens v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Kan. City, 214 
F.3d 1011, 1016 (8th Cir. 2000) (explaining the requirements for a prima facie case of disability dis-
crimination under the ADA). The ADA Amendments Act expanded the definition of “disability,” 
reasoning that “the question of whether an individual’s impairment is a disability under the ADA 
should not demand extensive analysis.” ADA Amendments Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-325, 
§ 2(b)(5), 122 Stat. 3553, 3554 (2008) (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 12103, 12205a). Reasonable accom-
modation is defined as including “appropriate adjustment or modifications of examinations,” that 
could be construed to include drug tests. § 12111(a). Employers can counter that a particular accom-
modation was not reasonable because it causes undue hardship. § 12111(10). 
 87 § 12111(3). Employers can raise the direct threat defense if they believe that the accommoda-
tion will cause “significant risk to the health or safety of others that cannot be eliminated by reasona-
ble accommodation.” Id. Direct threat defenses must be based on an individual assessment of the 
employee’s present ability to safely perform the essential functions of the job. See 29 C.F.R. 
§ 1630.2(r) (2014). 
 88 42 U.S.C. § 12114 (2012). 
 89 Id. 
 90 § 12111(6). The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”), the federal agency 
responsible for promulgating regulations for Title I of the ADA, has provided examples of drugs be-
ing taken under the supervision of a licensed health care professional. U.S. EQUAL EMP’T OPPOR-
TUNITY COMM’N, TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE MANUAL § 8.3 (1992), available at http://askjan.org/
links/ADAtam1.html#VIII, archived at http://perma.cc/F5QA-GDB6 [hereinafter TECHNICAL ASSIS-
TANCE MANUAL]. For one, “a person who takes morphine for the control of pain caused by cancer is 
not using a drug illegally if it is taken under the supervision of a licensed physician.” Id. Morphine is a 
Schedule II drug under the CSA and can be legally prescribed by a health care professional. 21 U.S.C. 
§ 812(c) (2012). Additionally, “a participant in a methadone maintenance treatment program cannot 
be discriminated against by an employer based upon the individual’s lawful use of methadone.” 
TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE MANUAL, supra § 8.3. Methadone is a Schedule II drug under the CSA and 
may also be legally prescribed by a health care professional. 21 U.S.C. § 812(c). Therefore, the EEOC 
illustrates that use of non-Schedule I drugs, taken under medical supervision, can be afforded ADA 
protection. See TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE MANUAL, supra § 8.3. 
 91 See James v. City of Costa Mesa, 700 F.3d 394, 404 (9th Cir. 2012) (rejecting a plaintiff’s 
argument that state-sanctioned, doctor-recommended marijuana use is excepted from the ADA’s defi-
nition of illegal drugs); Barber v. Gonzales, No. CV-05-0173, 2005 WL 1607189, at *1 (E.D. Wash. 
Jul. 1, 2005) (holding that the ADA illegal drug provision must be read consistently with the CSA and 
“it is immaterial whether such drug use is authorized by state law”). 
 92 See James, 700 F.3d at 404; Barber, 2005 WL 1607189, at *1. 
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2. State Disability Discrimination Laws 
Unlike the ADA, state disability discrimination laws allows employees to 
state a claim for employment discrimination related to medical marijuana use.93 
To that end, although the federal government extensively regulates the United 
States workplace as a whole, state law has a history of providing more compre-
hensive disability discrimination protection than the federal government.94 Sig-
nificantly, many states enacted legislation prohibiting private sector disability 
discrimination prior to the passing of the ADA.95 Additionally, states provide 
protection for disability discrimination through common law tort remedies for 
wrongful discharge.96 
To state a claim of disability discrimination under a state discrimination 
law, an employee generally has to establish the same prima facie case as under 
federal law.97 Nonetheless, state laws are significantly distinct from the ADA in 
other ways.98 For instance, in states that have enacted statutes legalizing medical 
                                                                                                                           
 93 See Hickox, supra note 57, at 1041. State disability nondiscrimination laws can protect medical 
marijuana users if the user is regarded as disabled by the employer. Id. 
 94 See Henry H. Drummonds, The Sister Sovereign States: Preemption and the Second Twentieth 
Century Revolution in the Law of the American Workplace, 62 FORDHAM L. REV. 469, 489–90, 500 
(1993) (“State law sometimes covers a broader range of discrimination than federal law.”). Notably, 
all fifty states have enacted statutes that prohibit discrimination in the workplace. See id.; Sandra F. 
Sperino, Revitalizing State Employment Discrimination Law, 20 GEO. MASON L. REV. 545, 557 n.109 
(2013) (citing to each of the fifty states’ disability discrimination statutes). 
 95 See Drummonds, supra note 94, at 491 n.113 (explaining that Illinois enacted its disability 
discrimination statute in 1980, New York enacted its disability discrimination statute in 1986, and 
Oregon enacted its disability discrimination statute in 1973). These state laws provided model legisla-
tion for the federal adoption of the ADA, offered practical experience about how a national law pro-
hibiting disability discrimination would affect private sector employers, and dulled business opposi-
tion to a federal disability discrimination regulatory scheme. Id. at 500. 
 96 Id. at 507 (explaining that these state tort laws alleviate the harshness of the employer-at-will 
rule); Cornelius J. Peck, Penetrating Doctrinal Camouflage: Understanding the Development of the 
Law of Wrongful Discharge, 66 WASH. L. REV. 719, 721 (1991) (explaining the law of wrongful dis-
charge generally). 
 97 See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 18.80.220 (2012) (explaining that an employer cannot refuse em-
ployment to a person or discriminate against a person based on the person’s disability when the de-
mands of the position do not require distinction on the basis of such disability); ARIZ. REV. STAT. 
ANN. § 41-1463 (2014) (West) (explaining that an employee must establish that they are disabled 
according to the statute and are qualified to perform the essential functions of the employment posi-
tion, with or without reasonable accommodation, assuming that such accommodation does not impose 
an undue burden on the employer); OR. REV. STAT. § 659A.030 (2013) (explaining that under the 
disability discrimination law, employers must make a reasonable accommodation to the known physi-
cal or mental limitations of a qualified individual with a disability who is a job applicant or employee, 
unless the employer can demonstrate that the accommodation would impose an undue hardship on the 
operation of the business of the employer); see also supra note 86 and accompanying text (explaining 
how to state a prima facie case employment disability discrimination under the ADA). 
 98 See Hickox, supra note 57, at 1041–42 (“The exclusion of illegal drug users from disability 
nondiscrimination statutes various throughout the . . . states with medical marijuana legislation.”); 
Sperino, supra note 94, at 557–58 (“None of the state [disability discrimination] statutes mimics the 
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marijuana, many of the laws do not carve out an exception to disability discrimi-
nation protection for employees who engage in illegal drug use.99 In contrast, in 
some states, legislation carves out an exception for employees from their disabil-
ity discrimination protections if the employee engages in illegal drug use, with-
out defining “illegal drug use” in terms of the CSA.100 Only some states explicit-
ly exempt employees from disability discrimination protection if they engage in 
“illegal drug use” as defined by the CSA.101 Additionally, although every state 
disability discrimination statutes provide defenses to employers, many states 
have not adopted the ADA’s “direct threat” defense.102 
In addition to disability discrimination statutes, state laws provide a remedy 
for aggrieved employees through common law wrongful discharge claims.103 
Wrongful discharge cases arise in the context of at-will employment where the 
employees are not covered by a written contract or statutory job protection 
scheme.104 As a general rule, “[a]n employer may discharge an at-will employee 
for no cause, good cause, or even cause morally wrong without fear of liabil-
ity.”105 Some states have carved out a narrow exception to this rule by attaching 
tort liability to employers who discharge employees “when the termination 
                                                                                                                           
federal statutes in all important respects. These differences suggest courts should be more cautious in 
deciding whether state laws should adopt the frameworks applied in federal discrimination claims.”). 
 99 ALASKA STAT. § 18.80.220 (2012); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 46a-60 (2013); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 
19 § 724 (West 2003 & Supp. 2012); DC CODE § 2-1402.11 (2013); HAW. REV. STAT. § 378-2 (Lex-
isNexis 2013); MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 151B § 4 (2006 & Supp. 2014); MONT. CODE. ANN. §§ 49-2-
303, 49-4-101 (2013); NEV. REV. STAT. § 613.330 (2013); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 10:5-12 (West 2007 & 
Supp. 2014); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 28-1-7 (2007 & Supp. 2013); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 21 § 495 (2012 & 
Supp. 2014); WASH. REV. CODE §§ 49.60.030, 49.60.180 (West 2007 & Supp. 2014). 
 100 ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 41-1463 (2014) (West); CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §§ 1290–
12926 (West 2007 & Supp. 2014); COLO. REV. STAT. § 24-34-402 (2014); 775 ILL. COMP. STAT. 
§ 5/2-102 (2013 & Supp. 2014); ME. REV. STAT. tit. 5 § 4572 (2004 & Supp. 2013); MICH. COMP. 
LAWS ANN. § 37.2102 (West 2001 & Supp. 2014); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 354-A:7 (2005 & Supp. 
2013). 
 101 OR. REV. STAT. § 659A.030 (2013); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 28-5-7 (2002 & Supp. 2013). In Ore-
gon and Rhode Island, employees are better off to state a claim for wrongful termination because it is 
a violation of public policy than to argue against the statutory mandate that the state disability dis-
crimination definition of “illegal use of drugs” comports with the federal CSA definition. See Coats, 
303 P.3d at 156 (Webb, J., dissenting) (explaining that wrongful termination claims have no federal 
counterpart and therefore do not require a consideration of the federal definition of the illegal use of 
drugs). 
 102 See Hickox, supra note 57, at 1044, 1053–54. Only California, Delaware, Maine, and Vermont 
mirror the ADA by providing a direct threat defense. Id. at 1044. In other states, employers can use 
the defense that the employee was unable to perform the essential duties of their position. See id. at 
1053–54. Both the direct threat defense and the defense that the employee was unable to perform the 
essential duties of their position require a reliable medical opinion in order to be substantiated. See id. 
at 1044, 1053–54. Another defense available to employers is that being drug-free is an essential char-
acteristic of employment, such as with safety sensitive positions. See id. at 1057. 
 103 See Drummonds, supra note 94, at 507. 
 104 L. Camille Hébert, Consideration of Lawful Off-duty Conduct as Invasion of Privacy, 2 EMP. 
PRIVACY L. § 13:47 (2014). 
 105 Roe, 257 P.3d at 595 (internal quotations omitted). 
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would frustrate a clear manifestation of public policy.”106 Still, this public policy 
exception is narrow, and it is significantly constrained by the employer’s ability 
to dismiss the employee’s case with an overriding justification for the dismis-
sal.107 
3. Relationship Between Federal and State Disability Discrimination Laws 
The ADA provides that it shall not limit any state law that provides greater 
or equal disability discrimination protection.108 Because of this statutory lan-
guage, neither field nor express preemption analysis is applicable in determining 
the interplay between federal and state disability discrimination laws.109 Actions 
under either state disability discrimination laws or wrongful termination claims 
that provide equal or greater protection than the ADA are consistent with the 
federal purposes of the ADA and do not stand as an obstacle to the federal reme-
dial scheme.110 
                                                                                                                           
 106 Id.; see, e.g., Petermann v. Int’l Bhd. of Teamsters, Local 396, 344 P.2d 25, 28 (Cal. Ct. App. 
1959) (holding that employee’s discharge for refusing to commit perjury violates public policy); Pal-
mateer v. Int’l Harvester Co., 421 N.E.2d 876, 879–80 (Ill. 1981) (holding that employee’s discharge 
for reporting theft to law enforcement officials violates public policy). To establish a case for wrong-
ful termination on the basis of public policy, an employee must establish that: (1) there exists a clear 
public policy; (2) discouraging the conduct in which they engaged would jeopardize the public policy; 
(3) the public policy linked conduct caused the dismissal; and (4) the defendant must not be able to 
offer an overriding justification for the dismissal. Roe, 257 P.3d at 595. In 1996, in Gardner v. Loomis 
Armored, Inc., the Washington Supreme Court recognized that the public policy exception generally 
arises in four situations: (1) when employees are fired for refusing to commit an illegal act, such as 
price fixing; (2) when employees are fired for performing a public policy duty or obligation, such as 
jury duty; (3) when employees are fired for exercising a legal right or privilege, such as filing a work-
er’s compensation claim; and (4) when employees are fired in retaliation for employer misconduct, 
such as whistleblowing. 913 P.2d 377, 379 (Wash. 1996). Furthermore, because these tort laws are 
under state law—not federal—there remains ambiguity as to whether federal law can articulate the 
public policy of a state. See Nancy Modesitt, Wrongful Discharge: The Use of Federal Law as a 
Source of Public Policy, 8 U. PA. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 623, 626 (2006). 
 107 Roe, 257 P.3d at 595. In order to support a claim for a violation of public policy, that policy 
must be “delineated in either constitutional or statutory provisions.” Ross, 174 P.3d at 215 (quoting 
Stevenson v. Superior Court, 941 P.2d 1157, 1161 (Cal. 1997)). The public policy cannot merely 
serve the interests of the individual but must benefit the public, and the policy must have been well-
established, fundamental, and substantial at the time of discharge. See Ross, 174 P.3d at 215. 
 108 42 U.S.C. § 12201(b) (2012). (“Nothing in this chapter shall be construed to invalidate or limit 
the remedies, rights, and procedures of any . . . law of any State . . . that provides greater or equal 
protection for the rights of individuals with disabilities than are afforded by this chapter.”).  
 109 Arizona, 132 S. Ct. at 2501 (explaining that express preemption applies in situations where 
Congress has written into the statute that states cannot enforce legislation in that particular area and 
field preemption applies in situations where the scheme of federal regulation is so comprehensive that 
it is reasonable that Congress left no room for states to supplement the law); see supra notes 62–66 
and accompanying text (explaining express and field preemption). 
 110 § 12201(b); see Treglia v. Town of Manlius, 313 F.3d 713, 723 (2d Cir. 2002) (explaining that 
the New York disability discrimination statute defines disability more broadly than the ADA and, 
therefore, the district court should not have dismissed plaintiff’s state disability discrimination claim 
based solely on the definition of disability as applied to the plaintiff’s ADA claim); Wood v. Cnty. of 
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Despite the fact that the preemption language in the ADA acknowledges 
that states can implement disability discrimination laws that differ from the 
ADA, many courts interpret state disability discrimination laws in tandem with 
the ADA.111 Most significant to the issue of medical marijuana use, courts have 
interpreted illegal use of drugs under state disability discrimination statutes as 
being consistent with the definition under the ADA.112 Although courts engage 
in this construction, the ADA makes it clear that the parallel reading of state and 
federal law is not statutorily mandated.113 
II. JUDICIAL INTERPRETATION OF MEDICAL MARIJUANA USE IN THE 
EMPLOYMENT CONTEXT 
In deciding whether an employer may fire an employee or refuse to hire an 
applicant for state-sanctioned medical marijuana use, courts to date have unani-
mously upheld the actions of the employer.114 This Part analyzes the claims 
                                                                                                                           
Alameda, 875 F. Supp. 659, 666 (N.D. Cal. 1995) (explaining that Congress intended plaintiffs to 
have the benefit of both federal and state causes of action for disability discrimination protection); see 
also supra note 68 and accompanying text (explaining implied conflict preemption). 
 111 See, e.g., Cotter v. Ajilon Servs., Inc., 287 F.3d 593, 597 (6th Cir. 2002) (“Michigan’s Persons 
with Disabilities Civil Rights Act [PWDCRA] substantially mirrors the ADA, and resolution of a 
plaintiff’s ADA claim will generally . . . resolve the plaintiff’s PWDCRA claim.”); Hutton v. Elf 
Atochem N. Am., Inc., 273 F.3d 884, 891 n.1 (9th Cir. 2001) (“The Oregon disability discrimination 
statute is modeled after the ADA.”); Fiumara v. President & Fellows of Harvard Coll., 526 F. 
Supp. 2d 150, 156 (D. Mass. 2007) (“In almost all relevant respects, Massachusetts disability discrim-
ination analysis is identical to that of ADA claims.”). But see Sperino, supra note 94, at 565 (arguing 
that state discrimination laws do not have to be interpreted consistently with their federal counter-
parts). 
 112 See Emerald Steel Fabricators, 230 P.3d at 521. In 2010, in Emerald Steel Fabricators v. 
Bureau of Labor & Industries, the Oregon Supreme Court noted that “Oregon law requires that [the 
Oregon disability discrimination statute] be interpreted consistently with” the ADA. Id. Although 
Oregon has interpreted the state and federal statutes consistently, there is no statutory mandate to do 
so either in the Oregon or federal law. See 42 U.S.C. § 12201 (2012); OR. REV. STAT. § 659A.030 
(2013); see also, e.g., Hutton, 273 F.3d at 891 n.1 (reasoning that the Oregon disability discrimination 
statute should be read consistently with the ADA); Snead v. Metro. Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co., 237 F.3d 
1080, 1087 (9th Cir. 2001) (reasoning that the standard for stating a prima facie case of disability 
discrimination under Oregon law is consistent with doing so under the ADA). 
 113 See § 12201. (“Nothing in this chapter shall be construed to invalidate or limit the remedies, 
rights, and procedures of any . . . law of any State . . . that provides greater or equal protection for the 
rights of individuals with disabilities than are afforded by this chapter.”). 
 114 See Casias v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 695 F.3d 428, 436–37 (6th Cir. 2012) (holding that the 
Michigan Medical Marijuana Act does not restrict a private employer’s ability to discipline employees 
for medical marijuana use and, therefore, the Act could not support a wrongful termination claim); 
Ross v. RagingWire Telecomms., Inc., 174 P.3d 200, 208 (Cal. 2008) (holding that the California Fair 
Employment and Housing Act does not require an employer to accommodate an employee who used 
medical marijuana and that an employee who is terminated for authorized medical marijuana use 
cannot state a cause of action for termination in violation of public policy); Coats v. Dish Network, 
L.L.C., 303 P.3d 147, 152 (Colo. App. 2013) (holding that state-licensed medical marijuana use is not 
a “lawful activity” under the Colorado employment discrimination law); Johnson v. Columbia Falls 
Aluminum Co. LLC, No. DA 08-0358, 2009 WL 865308, at *4 (Mont. Mar. 31, 2009) (holding that 
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brought by employees who have suffered adverse employment treatment due to 
their medical marijuana use, court opinions disagreeing with the employees’ ar-
guments, and dissenting judges have found merit in these arguments.115 Section 
A discusses employees’ claims that they were wrongfully terminated in violation 
of public policy.116 Section B discusses employees’ claims that they suffered dis-
ability discrimination.117 
A. Arguments for Wrongful Termination Based on Public Policy 
Employees have argued that termination or refusal to hire based on medical 
marijuana use constitutes wrongful discharge in violation of the public policy 
concerns underlying state medical marijuana laws.118 Despite the general rule 
that an employer may discharge an at-will employee without cause, states recog-
nize a common law tort claim for wrongful discharge when the termination 
would frustrate public policy.119 Cognizant of the fact that such an exception has 
the potential of exposing employers to liability, in 2011, in Roe v. TeleTech 
Customer Care Management, the Washington Supreme Court noted that courts 
must “proceed cautiously” when deciding whether to decide a case on public 
policy considerations when there is little legislative or judicial expression on the 
subject.120 
                                                                                                                           
an employee who was terminated for using medical marijuana could not state a claim under either the 
Montana Human Rights Act or the Americans with Disabilities Act); Emerald Steel Fabricators, Inc. 
v. Bureau of Labor & Indus., 230 P.3d 518, 536 (Or. 2010) (holding that the Oregon Medical Mariju-
ana Act was preempted by the federal Controlled Substances Act and, therefore, the employee’s use of 
medical marijuana was illegal and was not entitled to accommodation); Roe v. TeleTech Customer 
Care Mgmt. LLC, 257 P.3d 586, 594–95 (Wash. 2011) (holding that the Washington State Medical 
Use of Marijuana Act does not proclaim sufficient public policy to support a cause of action for 
wrongful termination). 
 115 See infra notes 118–170 and accompanying text. This Part is limited to a discussion of em-
ployee’s claims of wrongful termination and disability discrimination. See id. Employees have addi-
tionally brought claims under state medical marijuana laws, but courts have determined that these 
laws do not provide a private right of action against employers. See Casias, 695 F.3d at 435 (holding 
that the Michigan Medical Marijuana Act did not give an employee a private right of action against an 
employer because the Act does not regulate private employers); Johnson, 2009 WL 865308, at *2 
(holding that the Montana Medical Marijuana Act does not provide an employee with either an ex-
press or implied private right of action against an employer). But see Savage v. Maine Pretrial Servs., 
Inc., 58 A.3d 1138, 1143 (Me. 2013) (holding that, because the Maine Medical Use of Marijuana Act 
has a specific provision precluding an employer from discriminating against a medical marijuana user, 
the Act provides a private right of action for qualifying patients who have been discriminated against 
by employers). 
 116 See infra notes 118–135 and accompanying text. 
 117 See infra notes 136–170 and accompanying text. 
 118 See Casias, 695 F.3d at 436–37; Roe, 257 P.3d at 595. 
 119 Roe, 257 P.3d at 595; see Drummonds, supra note 94, at 507 (explaining the existence of 
wrongful termination suits for violating public policy at common law). 
 120 257 P.3d at 595 (quoting Thompson v. St. Regis Paper Co., 685 P.2d 1081, 1089 (Wash. 
1984)). In Roe, the plaintiff suffered from debilitating migraine headaches that caused chronic pain, 
nausea, blurred vision, and sensitivity to light. Id. at 588. In June 2006, the plaintiff began using med-
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The court in Roe outlined a four-part test for analyzing a public policy 
wrongful discharge action, explaining that the employee must prove that: (1) 
there exists a clear public policy, (2) discouraging the conduct in which they en-
gaged would jeopardize the public policy, (3) the public policy linked to the 
conduct that caused the dismissal, and (4) the defendant cannot offer an overrid-
ing justification for the dismissal.121 The court only applied the first prong, con-
cluding that the employee’s public policy argument failed because the Washing-
ton State Medical Use of Marijuana Act (“MUMA”) does not evince a “clear 
public policy” to forbid an employer from discharging an employee because the 
employee uses medical marijuana.122 
The court declined to find a “clear public policy” by reasoning that voters 
in support of the MUMA could not have intended such a public policy exception 
regarding wrongful termination claims.123 The only reference to employment in 
the voters’ pamphlet on the MUMA was the assertion that the law would prohibit 
marijuana use in the workplace.124 Further, previous court decisions discussed 
the purpose of MUMA solely in the context of an affirmative defense, not as a 
broad public policy to impose an employer accommodation obligation.125 Lastly, 
the court reasoned that, because medical marijuana remains illegal under federal 
law, holding that a public policy exists would not align with the narrow intention 
of the public policy exception.126 
                                                                                                                           
ical marijuana in accordance with the Washington State Medical Use of Marijuana Act. Id. at 588–89. 
In October 2006, the plaintiff was offered a position as a customer service representative with the 
defendant, but her position was terminated due to a positive drug test result. Id. 
 121 Id. at 595. 
 122 See id. at 595–96. 
 123 See id. 
 124 See id. at 596. In addition, MUMA itself only mentions employment in one instance, stating 
“[n]othing in this chapter requires any accommodation of any on-site medical use of [marijuana] in any 
place of employment.” WASH. REV. CODE § 69.51A.060(4) (West 2007 & Supp. 2014). The majority of 
medical marijuana statutes similarly offer no explicit mention of protection to registered users in the 
employment context and courts have rejected arguments that there are implicit protections for employees. 
Jennifer Gimler Brady & Michael B. Rush, Employment Protections Under Medical Marijuana Laws: 
The Changing Landscape, BLOOMBERG L. REP., 2 (Sept. 21, 2011), available at http://www.bna.com/
employment-protections-under-medical-marijuana-laws-the-changing-landscape-contributed-by-
jennifer-gimler-brady-and-michael-b-rush-potter-anderson-corroon-llp/, archived at http://perma.cc/
9W7Z-2FGJ. 
 125 See Roe, 257 P.3d at 596; see also State v. Hanson, 157 P.3d 438, 442 (Wash. Ct. App. 2007) 
(reasoning that the Washington Medical Use of Marijuana Act provides an affirmative defense to state 
criminal prosecutions for qualified patients); State v. Ginn, 117 P.3d 1155, 1159 (Wash. Ct. App. 
2005) (reasoning that the Washington Medical Use of Marijuana Act provides an affirmative defense 
to state criminal prosecutions for qualifying patients). 
 126 See Roe, 257 P.3d at 597; see also Ross, 174 P.3d at 215 (Kennard, J., concurring) (reasoning 
that there can be no public policy exception because it must be viewed against the backdrop of both 
federal criminal laws, which prohibit marijuana possession, and the ADA, which excludes protection 
to any employee who uses illegal drugs); Thompson, 685 P.2d at 1089 (explaining that the public 
policy exception has a narrow intention and that courts should proceed cautiously if called upon to 
declare public policy). 
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Applying similar reasoning, in 2012, in Casias v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., the 
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit also dismissed an employee’s public 
policy argument because there was no clear public policy.127 There, the court 
reasoned that Michigan voters could not have intended to create a new category 
of protected employees when enacting the Michigan Medical Marijuana Act 
(“MMMA”).128 The court concluded that the employee’s argument would “mark 
a radical departure from the general rule of at-will employment,” which is not 
the intention of the public policy exception.129 
The Roe and Casias courts narrowly interpreted the purpose of the statutes 
to conclude that no public policy for employee discrimination protection could 
be read into the statutes.130 To reach the opposite conclusion, the dissenting 
judge in Roe interpreted the purpose of the MUMA broadly, and argued that the 
employee stated a sufficient claim for wrongful termination.131 First, the dissent 
argued that the employee satisfied the first prong of the test because the MUMA 
states a clear public policy to protect employment discrimination.132 The dissent 
reasoned that the MUMA’s purpose is to protect the health, safety, and welfare of 
medical marijuana patients, and this evinces an intent to provide employment 
discrimination protection.133 The dissent also argued that the employer’s conduct 
would discourage other disabled employees from using medical marijuana, a 
treatment approved by Michigan voters.134 Therefore, allowing the employer to 
fire an employee for legal medical marijuana use jeopardizes the clear policy of 
the MUMA.135 
                                                                                                                           
 127 See 695 F.3d at 436–37. In Casias, the plaintiff was an employee at Wal-Mart from 2004 to 
2009, when the plaintiff was terminated for testing positive for marijuana in violation of the compa-
ny’s drug use policy. Id. at 431. The plaintiff suffered from sinus cancer and was issued a registry card 
under the Michigan Medical Marijuana Act and began using medical marijuana on June 15, 2009. Id. 
 128 See id. at 437. The Sixth Circuit agreed with the district court’s reasoning that, in passing the 
MMMA, voters could not have intended to have created a new category of protected employees. See 
id. The court stressed that the MMMA does not include any language regarding employment, nor does 
it confer a responsibility upon private employers to accommodate medical marijuana use. See id. 
 129 Casias, 695 F.3d at 437 (quoting Casias v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 764 F. Supp. 2d 914, 920 
(W.D. Mich. 2011)). 
 130 See Casias, 695 F.3d at 467; Roe, 257 P.3d at 595. 
 131 See Roe, 257 P.3d at 598–99 (Chambers, J., dissenting); see also supra note 121 (describing 
the four-part test for a prima facie case of public policy wrongful discharge). 
 132 See Roe, 257 P.3d. at 598 (Chambers, J., dissenting). This policy is stated at the beginning of 
the MUMA: “The people find that humanitarian compassion necessitates that the decision to authorize 
the medical use of marijuana by patients with terminal or debilitating illnesses is a personal, individu-
al decision, based upon their health care professional’s professional medical judgment and discretion.” 
See id. (citing WASH. REV. CODE § 69.51A.005(b) (West 2007 & Supp. 2014)). 
 133 See id. at 598–99; see supra note 47 (discussing the purpose behind medical marijuana stat-
utes). 
 134 Roe, 257 P.3d at 599 (Chambers, J., dissenting). 
 135 See id. at 598–99. Regarding the third prong of the public policy test, it was undisputed that 
the public policy was linked to the employee’s dismissal given that the employee’s protected conduct 
caused her employer to fire her. See id. Therefore, the dissent concluded that the employee established 
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B. Arguments for Wrongful Termination Based on Disability Discrimination 
In addition to public policy arguments, employees who have been terminat-
ed for medical marijuana use have sued their employers based on disability-
based discrimination.136 Courts have consistently held that state disability dis-
crimination statutes cannot extend their protection to medical marijuana use be-
cause marijuana use for medical purposes is illegal under federal law.137 Many 
state disability discrimination statutes preclude protection to employees who 
engage in the illegal use of drugs.138 Furthermore, even in states that lack such 
an express statutory exclusion, it is unlikely that a court will be convinced that 
allowing an employee to engage in illegal drug use is a reasonable accommoda-
tion.139 In determining how to define illegal use of drugs under state law, courts 
have relied on the federal definition.140 
This Section presents the two ways that courts have defined “illegal use of 
drugs” using the federal Controlled Substance Act (“CSA”) definition.141 Sub-
section 1 discusses how a court has defined an employee’s state-sanctioned use 
of medical marijuana as an illegal use of drugs on the basis of federal preemp-
tion by the CSA.142 Subsection 2 discusses how courts have defined employees’ 
use of state-sanctioned medical marijuana as an illegal use of drugs by imparting 
the federal definition onto the state law.143 
                                                                                                                           
a prima facie case for wrongful termination. See id. Further, the dissent explained that the fourth ele-
ment, which allows an employer to negate the employee’s case if the employer can offer an overriding 
justification for the dismissal, should be an issue presented to a jury. See id. Because the law does not 
require employers to employ drug impaired workers who cannot perform the essential functions of 
their position, the dissent reasoned that a jury would best be able to balance an employee’s prima facie 
case against the employer’s justification for the dismissal. See id. 
 136 See, e.g., Ross, 174 P.3d at 202–03 (discussing whether the plaintiff could state a cause of 
action for disability discrimination under the California Fair Employment and Housing Act for termi-
nation based on medical marijuana use); Emerald Steel Fabricators, 230 P.3d at 536 (discussing how 
the Oregon Medical Marijuana Act (“OMMA”) intersects with federal law in the context of a disabil-
ity discrimination claim); Washburn v. Columbia Forest Prods., Inc. 134 P.3d 161, 162 (Or. 2006) 
(discussing whether Oregon’s disability discrimination statutes require an employer to make disabil-
ity-related accommodations for an employee who uses medical marijuana for medical purposes). 
 137 See, e.g., Ross, 174 P.3d at 208 (holding that the CSA preempts the Compassionate Use Act 
(“CUA”)); Coats, 303 P.3d at 152 (holding that the CSA preempts the Colorado Civil Rights Act); 
Emerald Steel Fabricators, 230 P.3d at 536 (holding that the CSA preempts the OMMA). 
 138 See supra note 100 and accompanying text (outlining state disability discrimination statutes 
that preclude protection for employees engaging in illegal drug use). 
 139 Kellams v. Norco, Inc., No. 27811-5-III, 2009 WL 4676152, at *4 (Wash. Ct. App., Dec. 10, 
2009) (dismissing an employee’s discrimination claim when that employee was engaging in the illegal 
use of codeine without a prescription). 
 140 See infra notes 141–170 and accompanying text. 
 141 See infra notes 144–170 and accompanying text. 
 142 See infra notes 144–159 and accompanying text. 
 143 See infra notes 160–170 and accompanying text. 
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1. Preemption Regarding the CSA and State Medical Marijuana Statutes 
In 2010, in Emerald Steel Fabricators v. Bureau of Labor & Industries, the 
Oregon Supreme Court held that an employer who terminated an employee for 
using medical marijuana did not violate the Oregon statute for disability discrim-
ination.144 The court reasoned that, to the extent that the Oregon Medical Mari-
juana Act (“OMMA”) affirmatively authorizes the use of medical marijuana, the 
CSA preempts and nullifies the OMMA.145 The Oregon disability discrimination 
statue precludes protection for employees engaged in the illegal use of drugs.146 
Therefore, the court concluded that the employee’s use of the drug was illegal 
because the OMMA was nullified by the CSA, and consequently no state law 
could authorize the employee’s use of medical marijuana.147 
To reach the conclusion that the CSA preempts the Oregon law, the court 
engaged in an implied conflict preemption analysis.148 The court explained that, 
in passing the CSA, Congress intended to impose a blanket prohibition on the 
use of marijuana without regard to states permitting the use of marijuana for 
medical purposes.149 The court reasoned that a state law that authorizes conduct 
that federal law prohibits stands as an obstacle to the enforcement of federal 
law.150 Because the court found that the CSA preempted the Oregon statute, the 
Oregon statute was unenforceable.151 As a result, the court concluded that under 
                                                                                                                           
144 See 230 P.3d at 529. In Emerald Steel Fabricators, the plaintiff suffered from anxiety, panic 
attacks, nausea, vomiting, and severe stomach cramps. See id. at 520. After conventional drugs 
proved ineffective, in 2002 the employee began to use medical marijuana pursuant to the 
OMMA. See id. In 2003, the defendant hired the plaintiff to work as a drill press operator on a 
temporary basis. Id. After performing satisfactory work, the defendant hired the plaintiff on a 
permanent basis, but shortly thereafter discharged the employee after testing positive for ma-
rijuana in a mandatory drug test. Id. at 521. 
 145 See id. at 529. 
 146 See OR. REV. STAT. § 659A.112 (2013). 
 147 See Emerald Steel Fabricators, 230 P.3d at 529. 
 148 See id.; see supra note 68 and accompanying text (discussing implicit conflict preemption 
analysis). 
 149 See Emerald Steel Fabricators, 230 P.3d at 529 (citing United States v. Oakland Cannabis 
Buyers’ Coop., 532 U.S. 483, 494 & n.7 (2001)) (explaining that Congress enacted the CSA to impose 
a blanket federal prohibition on the use of marijuana, however Congress did not expressly indicate 
that states could not enact their own criminal drug laws or make different decisions about the appro-
priate use of marijuana). 
 150 See Emerald Steel Fabricators, 230 P.3d at 529. To apply this reasoning, the court relied on 
Michigan Canners & Freezers Ass’n, Inc. v. Agricultural Marketing & Bargaining Board. See 467 
U.S. 461, 478 (1984); Emerald Steel Fabricators, 230 P.3d at 529. In Michigan Canners, the U.S. 
Supreme Court held that a state law that permitted food producers to apply to a state board for authori-
ty to act as the exclusive bargaining agent for all producers of a particular community was preempted 
by a federal law that prohibited that very activity. See 467 U.S. at 478. The Court concluded that “be-
cause the Michigan Act authorizes producers’ associations to engage in conduct that the federal Act 
forbids” the state law is an obstacle to the federal law. See id. 
 151 See Emerald Steel Fabricators, 230 P.3d at 529. 
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both Oregon law and federal law, use of medical marijuana was illegal.152 In 
sum, because the Oregon disability discrimination statute precludes protection to 
any employee that is engaged in the illegal use of drugs, the employee in this 
case could not state a claim of employment discrimination.153 
The dissent in Emerald Steel Fabricators argued that the CSA does not 
preempt the OMMA because the state statute does not stand as an obstacle to the 
federal law.154 The dissent highlighted that Congress did not write an express 
preemption clause into the CSA, but rather intended to preserve state power in 
the realm of controlled substance regulation.155 Based on this congressional in-
tent, the dissent argued that an obstacle preemption analysis should begin with a 
presumption that the historic police powers exercised by the state of Oregon 
were not superseded by the CSA.156 From this presumption, the dissent argued 
that the Oregon statute neither overrides federal law nor prevents the federal 
government from enforcing the CSA.157 Because the CSA can be implemented 
and enforced in the federal sphere at the same time that Oregon authorizes the 
use of medical marijuana in the state sphere, the dissent concluded that there is 
no federal preemption.158 Accordingly, under this reasoning, state-sanctioned use 
of medical marijuana should not be not be considered an illegal use of drugs un-
der Oregon law.159 
                                                                                                                           
 152 See id. 
 153 See id. at 536. 
 154 Id. (Walters, J., dissenting). 
 155 Id. at 537; see 21 U.S.C. § 903 (2012) (stating that states the have authority to pass laws on the 
same subject matter so long as there is no “positive conflict between [the CSA] and that State law so 
that the two cannot consistently stand together”). The dissent stressed that the majority erred in failing 
to begin its preemption analysis with the presumption of state sovereignty. See Emerald Steel Fabri-
cator, 230 P.3d at 537 (Walters, J., dissenting); see also Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 42–43 (2005) 
(O’Connor, J., dissenting) (arguing that California’s Compassionate Use Act is an exercise of a state’s 
traditional and core police powers to define criminal law and protect the health, safety, and welfare of 
its citizens). 
 156 See Emerald Steel Fabricator, 230 P.3d at 536–37 (Walters, J. dissenting) (“A cornerstone of 
the Supreme Court’s Supremacy Clause analysis is that in all pre-emption cases, and particularly in 
those in which Congress has legislated in a field which the States have traditionally occupied, the 
Court starts with the assumption that the historic police powers of the States were not to be superseded 
by the Federal Act unless that was the clear and manifest purpose of Congress.”) (internal quotations 
omitted). 
 157 See id. The dissent argued that the majority was incorrect in finding that the standard of con-
duct and policy choice represented by the CSA prohibits a different state standard of conduct and 
policy choice. See id. Furthermore, the dissent reasons that, because the OMMA does not “give[] 
permission to violate the Controlled Substances Act or affect[] its enforcement, the Oregon act does 
not pose an obstacle to the federal act . . . .” See id. at 539. 
 158 Id. at 543. 
 159 Id. 
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2. Construing “Illegal Use of Drugs” with Federal Law 
In addition to defining state-sanctioned medical marijuana as an illegal use 
of drugs by preempting the state marijuana laws with the CSA, courts have also 
defined medical marijuana use as illegal under state law by applying the federal 
definition.160 For instance, in 2008, in Ross v. RagingWire Telecommunications, 
Inc., the Supreme Court of California held that the definition of “illegal use of 
drugs” under state law required a consideration of the federal definition.161 The 
court concluded that the California Fair Employment and Housing Act 
(“FEHA”) did not require an employer to accommodate an employee who used 
medical marijuana because medical marijuana use was illegal.162 The court rea-
soned that the California Compassionate Use Act could not give marijuana the 
same status as any legal prescription drug because medical marijuana remains 
illegal under federal law.163 Accordingly, because federal law precludes any state 
from completely legalizing marijuana for medical purposes, courts must define 
state-sanctioned medical marijuana use as an “illegal use of drugs.”164 Therefore, 
because California’s disability discrimination law precludes employees from 
protection when they are engaged in the illegal use of drugs, the court did not 
interpret state discrimination statutes as protecting medical marijuana use.165 
                                                                                                                           
 160 See Ross, 174 P.3d at 204 (explaining that no state law can completely define the use of medi-
cal marijuana as legal because the drug remains illegal under federal law); Coats, 303 P.3d at 150 
(holding that medical marijuana cannot be legal under state law because it is illegal under federal 
law). 
 161 Compare Ross, 174 P.3d at 204 (holding that the employee was denied disability discrimina-
tion protection due to his illegal use of drugs because the state cannot define marijuana use as legal 
while it remains illegal under federal law), with Emerald Steel Fabricators, 30 P.3d at 529 (holding 
that the employee was denied disability discrimination protection because the CSA preempts the 
OMMA). 
 162 Ross, 174 P.3d at 204. 
 163 See id. 
 164 Id. Similar to the majority’s reasoning in Ross, in 2013, in Coats v. Dish Network, L.L.C., the 
Colorado Court of Appeals held that for something to be “lawful,” it must be subject to both state and 
federal law. See 303 P.3d at 150–51. Although this case dealt with a statutory wrongful termination 
claim under the Colorado Civil Rights Act (“CCRA”) as opposed to a disability discrimination claim, 
the court relied on Ross to define “lawful.” See id. In Coats, the employee argued that the CCRA 
prohibits an employer from discharging an employee for “engaging in any lawful activity off the 
premises of the employer during nonworking hours.” Id. at 148 (quoting COLO. REV. STAT. § 24-34-
402.5(1) (2014)). Although the employee acknowledged that medical marijuana remains illegal under 
the CSA, the employee argued that “lawful activity” under the CCRA refers only to state law, not 
federal law. Id. Accordingly, because the Colorado Medical Marijuana Amendment legalizes medical 
marijuana use on the state level, the plaintiff reasoned that medical marijuana use was protected under 
the CCRA. Id. The Coats court disagreed, holding that the employer did not violate the CCRA by 
discharging an employee for testing positive for medical marijuana use because medical marijuana use 
is illegal under state and federal law. See id. at 150–51 (“Activities conducted in Colorado, including 
medical marijuana use, are subject to both state and federal law.”) (citing Raich, 545 U.S. at 29). 
 165 Ross, 174 P.3d at 204. 
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Although the majority in Ross applied the federal definition of illegal use of 
drugs to state law, the dissent distinguished state and federal law.166 The dissent 
argued that nothing in the FEHA supports the majority’s proposition that a re-
quested accommodation can never be deemed reasonable if it involves conduct 
that is criminal under federal law.167 Accordingly, the dissent argued that the em-
ployee stated a valid claim of disability discrimination under the FEHA.168 The 
dissent recognized that the employer has the ability to counter the employee’s 
cause of action with the argument that the employee’s use of off-duty medical 
marijuana had substantial adverse effects on the employer’s business opera-
tions.169 In Ross, however, because the employer did not present any facts to 
prove that the employee’s off-duty use of medical marijuana had substantial ad-
verse effects on the employer’s business operations, the dissent reasoned that the 
competing interests of the employee outweighed those of the employer.170 
III. A JOINT SOLUTION: STATES SHOULD TAKE JUDICIAL AND LEGISLATIVE 
ACTION TO PROVIDE EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION PROTECTION  
TO QUALIFIED PATIENT EMPLOYEES 
Although current case law regarding medical marijuana use and employ-
ment discrimination has favored employers, state legislation or judicial decisions 
could override this precedent.171 The current status of the law does not balance 
                                                                                                                           
 166 See id. at 212 (Kennard, J., dissenting). Like the Ross dissent, the dissent in Coats challenged 
the incorporation of federal law into the meaning of “lawful activity” under the CCRA. See Coats, 303 
P.3d at 157 (Webb, J., dissenting). The dissent in Coats also concluded that that the discharge of an 
employee based on off-duty conduct is primarily a matter of state concern and, thus, should only con-
cern state law. Id. 
 167 See Ross, 174 P.3d at 212 (Kennard. J., dissenting). 
 168 See id. at 213. 
 169 See id. 
 170 See id. at 214–15. The dissent further reasoned that the majority opinion did not deny that the 
FEHA may require an employer to accommodate a disabled employee’s physician-approved medical 
use of substances that could potentially impair job performance. See id. at 214 (“Considered strictly in 
terms of its physical effects relevant to employee productivity and safety, and not its legal status, 
marijuana does not differ significantly from many prescription drugs—for example, hydrocodone 
(Vicodin), hydromorphone (Dilaudid), oxycodone (OxyContin), methylphenidate (Ritalin), metha-
done (Dolophine), and diazepam (Valium)—that may affect cognitive functioning and have a poten-
tial for abuse.”). Judge Kennard concluded that medical marijuana use should be afforded the same 
protections under the FEHA, and that the employee’s complaint had stated a cause of action for disa-
bility discrimination under the FEHA. See id. 
 171 See, e.g., Casias v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 695 F.3d 428, 436–37 (6th Cir. 2012) (holding that 
the Michigan Medical Marijuana Act does not restrict a private employer’s ability to discipline em-
ployees for medical marijuana use and, therefore, the Act could not support a wrongful termination 
claim); Emerald Steel Fabricators, Inc. v. Bureau of Labor & Indus., 230 P.3d 518, 536 (Or. 2010) 
(holding that the Oregon Medical Marijuana Act was preempted by the federal Controlled Substances 
Act and, therefore, the employee’s use of medical marijuana was illegal and was not entitled to ac-
commodation); Roe v. TeleTech Customer Care Mgmt., 257 P.3d 586, 594–95 (Wash. 2011) (holding 
that the Washington State Medical Use of Marijuana Act does not proclaim sufficient public policy to 
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the competing interests of employees and employers, and it forces medical mari-
juana patients to make the impossible choice between employment and medical 
treatment.172 This Part argues that employees who are terminated for their use of 
state-sanctioned medical marijuana should be able to state a claim for discrimi-
nation under state law.173 First, Section A argues that courts should conclude that 
state-sanctioned medical marijuana use is not an “illegal use of drugs” under 
state law and, therefore, state disability discrimination statutes should protect 
employees using medical marijuana.174 Second, Section B argues that state legis-
latures should amend their medical marijuana statutes to explicitly provide pro-
tection for medical marijuana users in the employment context.175 In doing so, 
states will provide a private right of action, as well as a wrongful discharge for 
violation of public policy claim, for employees who have suffered discrimination 
from their employers due to medical marijuana use.176 
A. Courts Should Permit Employment Disabilities Claims for Medical 
Marijuana Users Under State Law 
Courts should not dismiss medical marijuana users’ state law claims of dis-
ability discrimination for failure to state a claim.177 By allowing these claims to 
proceed, the competing interests of the employers and employees can be proper-
                                                                                                                           
support a cause of action for wrongful termination); see also Matthew D. Macy, Employment Law and 
Medical Marijuana—An Uncertain Relationship, 41 COLO. LAW. 57, 61 (2012), available at 
http://www.macylawfirm.com/pdf/The_Colorado_Lawyer_Jan_2012_MMacy.pdf, archived at http://
perma.cc/5H7H-P6UD (explaining that the current judicial landscape regarding medical marijuana use 
in the employment context is likely to change because (1) the intersection of medical marijuana and 
employment law is a relatively new and evolving area, (2) the case law regarding this issue is limited, 
and (3) the split between federal and state law creates confusion). 
 172 See Ross v. RagingWire Telecomms., Inc., 174 P.3d 200, 214, 216 (Cal. 2008) (Kennard, J., 
dissenting) (arguing that an employee who is terminated for off-duty, state-sanctioned medical marijuana 
use ought to be able to state a claim of disability discrimination, just as if they were terminated for using 
a federally legal, prescribed medicine, and that this would best balance the interests of employees and 
employers); Hickox, supra note 57, at 1054 (arguing that if an employee raises a prima facie case of 
discrimination, this balances the needs of the employee and employer because the employer can then try 
to establish that any use of marijuana prevents the user from performing adequately). 
 173 See infra notes 177–217 and accompanying text. 
 174 See infra notes 177–206 and accompanying text. 
 175 See infra notes 207–217 and accompanying text. 
 176 See infra notes 207–217 and accompanying text. 
 177 See Emerald Steel Fabricators, 230 P.3d at 537 (Walters, J., dissenting); Ross, 174 P.3d at 216 
(Kennard, J., dissenting). To state a successful claim of disability discrimination under state discrimi-
nation laws, an employee must generally show that they: (1) are disabled; (2) are qualified, with or 
without reasonable accommodation to perform the essential functions of the job at issue; and (3) have 
suffered an adverse employment decision because of the disability. See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. 
§ 18.80.220 (2012) (listing the requirements for a successful disability discrimination claim); CONN. 
GEN. STAT. § 46a-60 (2013) (describing the burden of proof for a disability discrimination claim); 
D.C. CODE § 2-1402.11 (2013) (outlining the prima facie case for disability discrimination). 
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ly balanced.178 In the context of medical marijuana, an employee’s claim for dis-
ability discrimination turns on whether the accommodation to allow the employ-
ee to use medical marijuana while off duty is reasonable.179 This Section argues 
that courts should deny employers’ defenses that employees cannot state a disa-
bility discrimination claim because state-sanctioned, off-duty medical marijuana 
use is not a reasonable accommodation because it constitutes an illegal use of 
drugs under state law.180 Subsection 1 argues that state-sanctioned medical mari-
juana use is not illegal under state law because the Controlled Substances Act 
(“CSA”) does not preempt state law.181 Subsection 2 argues that the state defini-
tion of “illegal use of drugs” does not necessitate an incorporation of the federal 
definition.182 
1. State Medical Marijuana Statutes Are Not Preempted by the CSA 
Although not universally accepted, many courts have held that the CSA 
does not preempt state statutes that provide affirmative defenses to state prosecu-
tion of medical marijuana use.183 Nonetheless, in 2010, in Emerald Steel Fabri-
                                                                                                                           
 178 See Ross, 174 P.3d at 214, 216 (Kennard, J., dissenting). In cases of employment discrimina-
tion regarding medical marijuana use, the employee’s interest of avoiding termination compete with 
the employer’s interest of maintaining a safe and functional work environment. See id. Marijuana, like 
other prescription drugs, may affect cognitive functioning and, therefore, its medical use poses some 
risks of absenteeism and impaired productivity among employees. See id. at 214–15. In order to best 
balance these competing interests, an employee who is terminated for off-duty, state-sanctioned use of 
medical marijuana ought to be able to state a claim of disability discrimination, just as they would be 
able to do if they were terminated for using federally legal prescribed medication. See id. In response 
to the employee’s prima facie case of disability discrimination under state law, the employer has sev-
eral defenses available to ensure that the safety and efficiency of its workplace is preserved. See Hick-
ox, supra note 57, at 1044, 1053, 1057 (explaining that an employer can overcome an employee’s 
prima facie case for disability discrimination with various defenses); supra note 102 and accompany-
ing text (outlining employer defenses for disability discrimination). 
 179 See supra notes 55, 77–78 (explaining that most medical marijuana patients qualify as disa-
bled under state disability discrimination laws). 
 180 See infra notes 183–206 and accompanying text. 
181 See infra notes 183–199 and accompanying text. 
 182 See infra notes 200–206 and accompanying text. 
 183 Compare Cnty. of San Diego v. San Diego NORML, 81 Cal. Rptr. 3d 461, 483 (Cal. Ct. App. 
2008), cert denied 556 U.S. 1235 (2009) (holding the California Medical Marijuana Program was not 
preempted), People v. Crouse, No. 12-CA-2298, 2013 WL 6673708, at * 9 (Colo. App. Dec. 19, 
2013) (holding that there is no preemption for the state medical marijuana law), and Beek v. City of 
Wyoming, 846 N.W.2d 531, 534 (Mich. 2014) (holding that the state’s medical marijuana statute was 
not preempted by federal law), with Haeberle v. Lowden, No. 2011-CV-709, 2012 WL 7149098, at 
*3–4 (D. Colo. Aug. 8, 2012) (finding that the state’s medical marijuana statute was preempted), and 
Emerald Steel Fabricators, 230 P.3d at 525 (holding that federal law preempted the state medical 
marijuana scheme). The U.S. Supreme Court’s decision to deny writ of certiorari in County of San 
Diego v. San Diego NORML further supports the argument that the CSA does not preempt state medi-
cal marijuana statutes. See San Diego NORML, 566 U.S. 1235 (2009). There, the U.S. Supreme Court 
declined to overturn the California Court of Appeal’s holding that the CSA does not preempt the Cali-
fornia Medical Marijuana Program, passed in 2003 to augment the 1996 Compassionate Use Act. See 
id. 
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cators, Inc. v. Bureau of Labor & Industry, the Oregon Supreme Court relied on 
flawed reasoning to hold that the CSA preempts the Oregon Medical Marijuana 
Act.184 The dissent in Emerald Steel Fabricators explained that the majority 
failed to begin its analysis with a presumption against preemption because the 
CSA involves an area historically governed by state police powers.185 Ignoring 
this, the District Court of Colorado has since adopted the majority’s conclusion 
in Emerald Steel Fabricators.186  
Courts should cease adopting Emerald Steel Fabricators’s flawed holding 
because it gives employers an unwavering defense against employment discrim-
ination claims from employees using medical marijuana.187 The preemption 
analysis regarding the CSA and state medical marijuana laws must instead begin 
with the assumption that Congress did not intend to supersede the historic police 
powers exercised by states by enacting the CSA.188 This is the proper interpreta-
tion because the CSA contains a savings clause intended to preserve state law.189 
                                                                                                                           
 184 230 P.3d at 525; see id. at 538 (Walters, J. dissenting) (arguing that the majority wrongly con-
cluded that the CSA precludes the enforcement of the Oregon Medical Marijuana Act (“OMMA”) and 
wrongly limited the state’s power to make its own law). The OMMA states that “[a] person who pos-
sesses a registry identification card . . . may engage in . . . the medical use of marijuana.” OR. REV. 
STAT. § 475.306(1) (2013). Furthermore, the Act defines a registry identification card as “a document 
issued by the authority that identifies a person authorized to engage in the medical use of marijuana.” 
OR. REV. STAT. § 475.302(10) (2013) (emphasis added). The Oregon Supreme Court concluded that 
this these two provisions together affirmatively authorize the use of marijuana for medical purposes. 
Emerald Steel Fabricators, 230 P.3d at 525. 
 185 Emerald Steel Fabricators, 230 P.3d at 537 (Walters, J., dissenting). Preemption analysis 
starts “with the assumption that the historic police powers of the States were not to be superseded by 
the Federal Act unless that was the clear and manifest purpose of Congress.” Wyeth v. Levine, 555 
U.S. 555, 565 (2009) (internal quotations omitted). Significantly, the majority in Emerald Steel Fabri-
cators did not begin the preemption analysis with this presumption. See 230 P.3d at 537. 
186 See San Diego NORML, 81 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 483. 
 187 Emerald Steel Fabricators, 230 P.3d at 543 (Walters, J., dissenting) (explaining that the sig-
nificant consequence of this reasoning was that the employee was disqualified from the benefits of 
Oregon’s antidiscrimination protections because it would be unreasonable for the employer to ac-
commodate medical marijuana use). 
 188 Id. at 536; see also San Diego NORML, 81 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 478–79 (reasoning that, because 
the California Medical Marijuana Program addresses medicine, a field historically occupied by the 
states, the preemption analysis must begin with a presumption against preemption). Applying the 
implied conflict preemption analysis is the only applicable framework in this context because the CSA 
states that the federal law will prevail over state law in instances where there is “positive conflict 
between that provision of this subchapter and that State law so that the two cannot consistently stand 
together.” See 21 U.S.C. § 903 (2012); see supra note 68 and accompanying text (discussing implied 
conflict preemption). Because impossibility preemption does not apply here, courts turn to an obstacle 
preemption analysis. See supra notes 68 and accompanying text (explaining that it is not physically 
impossible to comply with logically inconsistent statutes because a person can abstain from doing the 
activity that one statute authorizes and the other statute prohibits). 
 189 See § 903 (“No provision of this subchapter shall be construed as indicating an intent on the 
part of the Congress to occupy the field in which that provision operates, including criminal penalties, 
to the exclusion of any State law on the same subject matter which would otherwise be within the 
authority of the State, unless there is a positive conflict between that provision of this subchapter and 
that State law so that the two cannot consistently stand together.”); see also Wyeth, 555 U.S. at 567 
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Given that ninety-nine percent of marijuana-based arrests in the United States 
are made under state law, the CSA controls an area historically governed by state 
police powers, namely drug control.190 Additionally, states have “great latitude 
under their police powers to legislate as to the protection of the lives, limbs, 
health, comfort, and quiet of all persons.”191 Furthermore, by writing a savings 
clause into the CSA, Congress recognized that it was encroaching on an area 
traditionally governed by states, and this clause significantly narrows the scope 
of Congress’s intended invalidation of state law.192 
With this reality in mind, the next step in the implied preemption analysis 
should be to determine the underlying purpose of the CSA.193 The U.S. Supreme 
Court has suggested that the main objective of the CSA was to “conquer drug 
abuse and to control the legitimate and illegitimate traffic in controlled substanc-
es” and to “combat[ ] recreational drug abuse.” 194 This purpose is clear by read-
ing the statutory text of the CSA itself, which states that “federal control of the 
intrastate incidents of the traffic in controlled substances is essential to the effec-
tive control of the interstate incidents of such traffic.”195 State statutes that af-
firmatively authorize the use of medical marijuana do not undercut the federal 
government’s ability to combat recreational drug abuse at the federal level.196 
Indeed, the Department of Justice has admitted that it is not within the federal 
government’s interests to federally prosecute medical marijuana patients who are 
                                                                                                                           
(reasoning that a provision in the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act that is nearly identical to 21 
U.S.C. § 903 was a savings clause intended to preserve state power). 
 190 See MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 333.26422 (West 2001 & Supp. 2014) (“Data from the Feder-
al Bureau of Investigation Uniform Crime Reports and the Compendium of Federal Justice Statistics 
show that approximately 99 out of every 100 marihuana arrests in the United States are made under 
state law, rather than under federal law.”). 
 191 Gonzales v. Oregon, 546 U.S. 243, 270 (2006) (quoting Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470, 
475 (1996)). 
 192 § 903; see San Diego NORML, 81 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 479 (explaining that the Compassionate Use 
Act addresses a field historically occupied by the states and cautions court to narrowly interpret Con-
gress’s intended invalidation of state law). 
 193 See supra note 68 and accompanying text (explaining that obstacle preemption looks to the 
purpose of the federal law to determine whether the state statute stands as an obstacle to the full pur-
poses and objectives of Congress); supra notes 47 and accompanying text (explaining the purposes 
behind the state medical marijuana statutes); see also Florida Lime & Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Paul, 
373 U.S. 132, 144–46 (1963) (explaining that, in order to determine whether a state law stands as an 
obstacle to the full purposes and objectives of Congress, the purposes and objectives of the state stat-
ute at issue must also be identified). 
 194 Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 9, 12–13 (2005); Oregon, 546 U.S. at 272. 
 195 21 U.S.C. § 801(6) (2012). 
 196 See San Diego NORML, 81 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 481–82 (“The purpose of the CSA is to combat 
recreational drug use, not to regulate a state’s medical practices.”); see also Cole 2013 Memorandum, 
supra note 70, at 3–4 (explaining that federal prosecutors can—and should—review marijuana cases 
on a case-by-case basis in order to combat enumerated harms of particular federal concern, none of 
which refer to medical marijuana use). 
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authorized to use marijuana under state law.197 This fact, along with the pre-
sumption that Congress did not intend the CSA to supersede the historic police 
powers exercised by the state, illustrates that courts should conclude that state 
medical marijuana statutes are not preempted by the CSA.198 Accordingly, em-
ployers should not be permitted to rely on this unsound preemption argument to 
avoid liability under state disability discrimination laws.199 
2. “Illegal Use of Drugs” Under State Law Does Not Require Consideration 
of Federal Law 
Courts should not construe state definitions of “illegal use of drugs” under 
state law to incorporate the federal definition.200 The majority of states with 
medical marijuana statutes either have no statutory mandate in their disability 
discrimination statute to incorporate the federal CSA’s definition of “illegal use 
of drugs” or do not statutorily preclude disability discrimination protection due 
to the “illegal use of drugs.”201 Given that there is no statutory requirement to 
impose the federal definition of illegal drugs to these state statutes, courts should 
                                                                                                                           
 197 Cole 2013 Memorandum, supra note 70, at 3 (discussing that focusing enforcement efforts on 
seriously ill individuals is unlikely to be an efficient use of federal resources). Although prosecuting 
recreational marijuana use at the federal level may not be in the federal government’s best interest, the 
Cole 2013 Memorandum makes it clear that state medical marijuana statutes do not preclude the fed-
eral government from doing so. See id. Therefore, state medical marijuana statutes do not stand in the 
federal government’s way of controlling instances of drug traffic at the federal level. See id. 
 198 See San Diego NORML, 81 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 479 (holding that the CSA does not preempt Cali-
fornia’s medical marijuana statute because it is not impossible for both laws to simultaneously be 
enforced); Crouse, 2013 WL 6673708, at *9 (holding that the state’s medical marijuana statute was 
not preempted by the CSA based on obstacle preemption); Beek, 846 N.W.2d at 539 (holding that the 
state’s medical marijuana statute acknowledges the CSA and is not an obstacle to the federal law). 
 199 See Emerald Steel Fabricators, 230 P.3d at 544 (Walters, J., dissenting). The dissenting opin-
ion in Emerald Steel Fabricators explains that, absent express preemption, a policy choice by the 
federal government does not alone establish an implied intent to preempt contrary state law. See id. 
Further, the dissent argues that the majority’s opinion limits Oregon’s legislative authority. See id. 
Ultimately, the dissent reasons that the right of reasonable accommodation for disabled persons who 
use medical marijuana in compliance with Oregon law is a right that the Oregon legislature intended, 
and had to power to enact, in passing the Oregon Medical Marijuana Act. See id. 
 200 See Sperino, supra note 94, at 565. Under the Federal CSA, any marijuana use—recreational 
or medical—is an illegal use of drugs. See 21 U.S.C. § 812(b)–(c) (2012). A determination that state-
sanctioned medical marijuana use is an illegal use of drugs under state law would be detrimental to an 
employee’s disability discrimination claim because state disability discrimination statutes either statu-
torily preclude protection for employees using illegal drugs or a court would find that accommodating 
illegal drug use to be unreasonable. See supra notes 99–100, 139 and accompanying text (explaining 
that many state laws do not incorporate the federal definition of illegal drug use in their discrimination 
statutes). 
 201 Compare, e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 18.80.220 (2012) (providing no statutory mandate to incorpo-
rate the CSA’s definition of “illegal use of drugs”), CONN. GEN. STAT. § 46a-60 (2013) (same), and 
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 19 § 724 (West 2003 & Supp. 2012) (same), with ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 41-
1463 (2014) (West) (providing no statutory preclusion for disability discrimination protection due to 
the “illegal use of drugs”); CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §§ 1290–12926 (West 2007 & Supp. 2014) 
(same); COLO. REV. STAT. § 24-34-402 (2014) (same). 
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not feel compelled to “plunge[ ] state laws into the federal . . . morass,” because 
states may “have made different legislative choices.”202 It is not a novel concept 
that state law sometimes provides broader discrimination protection than federal 
law.203 Furthermore, greater disability protection for employees under state law 
is in the spirit of the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”).204 Accordingly, 
courts should not consider the federal definition of “illegal use of drugs” when 
deciding state disability discrimination claims.205 This will allow employees to 
state a claim of disability discrimination under state law, and will best balance 
the competing interests of employers and employees.206 
B. State Legislatures Should Amend Their Medical Marijuana Laws to 
Explicitly Provide Employment Discrimination Protection  
for Qualified Medical Marijuana Patients 
Although courts can, and should, take action to ensure that qualified patient 
employees who suffer adverse employment action due to their medical marijua-
na use can state a prima facie of disability discrimination under state law, state 
legislatures also ought to take action to ensure that the competing interest of em-
ployees and employers are met in the context of a medical marijuana employ-
ment discrimination claim.207 It is unlikely that the federal government will le-
                                                                                                                           
 202 See Sperino, supra note 94, at 565; see also supra note 101 (noting that Oregon and Rhode 
Island are the only two states that explicitly define illegal use of drugs in terms of the Federal CSA).  
 203 See Drummonds, supra note 94 at 489–90, 500 (explaining that state discrimination laws cov-
er a broader range of discrimination than federal law). In states that have passed medical marijuana 
laws, qualified medical marijuana use is legal and state sanctioned. See supra note 44 (referring to the 
twenty-four jurisdictions that have legalized medical marijuana use). Therefore, the state definition of 
illegal use of drugs affords greater disability discrimination protection to qualified medical marijuana 
patient employees. See Ross, 174 P.3d at 214 (Kennard, J., dissenting). 
 204 42 U.S.C. § 12201(b) (2012) (providing that “[n]othing in this chapter shall be construed to 
invalidate or limit the remedies, rights, and procedures of any . . . law of any State . . . that provides 
greater or equal protection for the rights of individuals with disabilities than are afforded by this chap-
ter”). 
 205 See Sperino, supra note 94, at 565 (explaining that courts should not treat interpretations of 
federal discrimination law to be presumptively applied to state law claims). 
 206 See Bates v. Dura Auto. Sys., Inc., 650 F. Supp. 2d 754, 772 n.6 (M.D. Tenn. 2009) (reversed 
in part on other grounds) (noting that there is clearly a need to balance the health needs of the employ-
ee with the legitimate needs of workplace safety); Hickox, supra note 57, at 1043–44 (explaining the 
defenses that employers can raise after an employee has stated a claim for disability discrimination 
due to medical marijuana use). 
 207 Roe, 257 P.3d at 599 (Chambers, J., dissenting) (arguing that the Washington legislature 
should take action to ensure that the interests of patient employees are met); see Elizabeth Hurwitz, 
Comment, Out of the Shadows, into the Light: Preventing Workplace Discrimination Against Medical 
Marijuana Users, 46 U.S.F.L. REV. 249, 250 (2011) (arguing that California should amend the Cali-
fornia Compassionate Use Act to explicitly require employers to accommodate off-duty, off-premises 
medical marijuana use by qualified patient employees). In 2011, in Roe v. TeleTech Customer Care 
Management, the Washington Supreme Court’s dissent bemoans the outcome of the case that prohib-
its employees from using medical marijuana regardless of whether the marijuana was consumed “on 
site” or whether the “the medical marijuana affects the employee’s job performance, or whether the 
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galize medical marijuana use in the near future208 and, therefore, state legisla-
tures need to take action to ensure that disabled citizens are afforded protection 
for their use of a state-sanctioned therapeutic remedy. 209 The majority of state 
medical marijuana laws do not speak to employment law or discrimination pro-
tections for medical marijuana patients.210 These states should instead emulate 
the medical marijuana statutes recently passed by several states by amending 
their laws to provide statutory employment discrimination protection for quali-
fied medical marijuana patients.211 
                                                                                                                           
employer can reasonably accommodate the employee’s medical use.” Roe, 257 P.3d at 599 (Cham-
bers, J., dissenting). Because of the result of the majority’s opinion, the dissent “urge[s] the legislature 
to thoughtfully review and improve the [Washington Medical Use of Marijuana Act].” See id. 
 208 See supra note 41 (discussing the various failed petitions to reschedule marijuana as a Sched-
ule II substance under the CSA). Furthermore, in the event that marijuana is rescheduled under federal 
law, this may not have the effect of federally legalizing medical marijuana because just because a drug 
can be prescribed does not mean that it will be federally approved to be prescribed. See Kevin A. 
Sabet, Much Ado About Nothing: Why Rescheduling Won’t Solve Advocates’ Medical Marijuana 
Problem, 58 WAYNE L. REV. 81, 87 (2012); Claire Frezza, Note, Medical Marijuana: A Drug Without 
a Medical Model, 101 GEO. L.J. 1117, 1118–19 (2013). Significantly, for non-Schedule I controlled 
substances, the CSA and the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) work together to ensure that pre-
scribed medications meet exacting standards of quality, safety, and efficacy. Sabet, supra at 88. Drugs 
that consist of raw plant material like marijuana are unable to meet the FDCA’s exacting standards 
because these drugs vary significantly in their composition, can be contaminated, and cannot be ad-
ministered in reproducible doses. Id. The Federal Drug Administration has never approved raw plant 
materials listed in Schedule II for prescription. Id. Therefore, if the FDA does not approve marijuana 
for prescription, medical marijuana use would remain illegal under federal law despite the drug’s non-
Schedule I status under the CSA. Id. It has been argued that, coupled with rescheduling, a new federal 
agency outside of the FDA should be established to administer and prescribe marijuana. Frezza, supra 
at 1138. 
 209 See Hurwitz, supra note 207, at 250. One proposal argues that California should amend the 
California Compassionate Use Act to explicitly require employers to accommodate off-duty, off-
premises medical marijuana use by qualified patient employees. See id. Such an amendment would 
provide a civil cause of action for any person who has suffered such discrimination. Id. at 260. More-
over, this amendment would balance the interests of the employer by precluding any safety sensitive 
employees from using medical marijuana as well as precluding accommodations should the employee 
be unable to perform their essential duties. Id. at 260–61. Although this proposed amendment passed a 
vote in the Senate Judiciary Committee on April 5, 2011, it has since died due to inactivity. See Cur-
rent Bill Status S.B. No. 129, LEGINFO.CA.GOV, available at http://www.leginfo.ca.gov/pub/11-
12/bill/sen/sb_0101-0150/sb_129_bill_20120201_status.html, archived at http://perma.cc/9SGG-
3EDC (last visited Oct. 10, 2014). Nonetheless, this illustrates movement among the state legislatures 
to adopt such explicit statutory protections for qualifying patient employees. See Hurwitz, supra note 
207, at 250. 
 210 See Michael D. Moberly & Charitie L. Hartsig, Smoke—and Mirrors? Employers and the 
Arizona Medical Marijuana Act, 47 ARIZ. ATT’Y 30, 30 (July/Aug. 2011), available at http://www.
rcalaw.com/files/oldwebsite/publications/smokeandmirrors.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/J96S-
5637 (explaining that most state medical marijuana laws do not directly address the employment is-
sues implicated by the use of marijuana for medical purposes). 
 211 See ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 36-2813 (2014) (West); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 21a-408p 
(2013); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 16 § 4905A (West 2003 & Supp. 2012); 410 ILL. COMP. STAT. § 130/40 
(2013 & Supp. 2014); ME. REV. STAT. tit. 22, § 2423-E(2) (2004 & Supp. 2013); see also Hurwitz, 
supra note 207, at 250 (arguing that California should adopt explicit statutory protections against 
employment discrimination for medical marijuana patients). 
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Such statutory amendments would balance the competing interests of the 
employer and employee.212 On one hand, these amendments would provide a 
private right of action for qualifying patient employees who have been discrimi-
nated against by their employers due to their off-duty, state-sanctioned use of 
medical marijuana.213 Furthermore, these statutory amendments would allow 
qualifying patient employees to bring successful wrongful termination claims 
because there would be a clear, statutory public policy to forbid an employer 
from discharging an employee based on the employee’s medical marijuana 
use.214 On the other hand, state legislatures can ensure that these amendments 
protect employers’ concerns regarding possible loss of productivity and third-
party liability that may arise if an employees’ job performance is impaired due to 
medical marijuana use.215 By explicitly prohibiting an employee’s ability to use 
medical marijuana on-site or during employment hours, these amendments can 
protect employers’ legitimate interest in ensuring that their employees are able to 
perform essential job functions.216 In sum, all states with medical marijuana leg-
islation should move to adopt antidiscrimination provisions because they balance 
the interests of both employees and employers and, moreover, provide signifi-
cant clarity to an unclear area of the law.217 
CONCLUSION 
In states where medical marijuana has been legalized, medical marijuana 
patients currently are forced to make an impossible choice: continue receiving 
the benefits of marijuana use in the treatment of their debilitating disability and 
                                                                                                                           
 212 See Moberly & Hartsig, supra note 210, at 30 (explaining that the Arizona provision to its 
Medical Marijuana act that explicitly protects patient employees from discrimination equally balances 
the competing interests of employers and employees by allowing termination if the employee is under 
the influence during work hours or if the employer would lose federal funding by maintaining em-
ployment of the patient employee); Hurwitz, supra note 207, at 260–61 (reasoning that employers’ 
interests would be balanced against the protection that such statutes provide to employees because 
there are several defenses that employers can raise after an employee has stated a claim for disability 
discrimination due to medical marijuana use). 
 213 See Savage v. Maine Pretrial Servs., Inc., 58 A.3d 1138, 1143 (Me. 2013) (holding that 
Maine’s medical marijuana statute provides a private right of action to bring a discrimination claim). 
This statute reads that an “employer . . . may not refuse to . . . employ . . . or otherwise penalize a 
person solely for that person’s status as a qualifying patient.” ME. REV. STAT. tit. 22, § 2423-E(2) 
(2004 & Supp. 2013). 
 214 See Roe, 257 P.3d at 594–95. 
 215 See Moberly & Hartsig, supra note 210, at 30; Hurwitz, supra note 207, at 260. 
216 CONN. GEN. STAT. § 21a-408p(b)(3) (2013) (“Nothing in this subdivision shall restrict 
an employer’s ability to prohibit the use of intoxicating substances during work hours or re-
strict an employer’s ability to discipline an employee for being under the influence of intoxi-
cating substances during work hours.”); see also Hurwitz, supra note 207, at 260 (explaining 
that the proposed California amendment would not cause risks to employers because it did 
not grant a blanket right to use marijuana to all workers at all times). 
217 See Moberly & Hartsig, supra note 210, at 30; Hurwitz, supra note 207, at 260. 
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become unemployed, or continue their employment without medical marijuana 
treatment and try to endure their chronic pain. It is unlikely that voters and legis-
lators intended to impose such a cruel situation on medical marijuana patients 
when enacting these state laws. Therefore, states should provide protection to 
those medical marijuana patients who suffer adverse employment action because 
of activities that the state authorizes. This would further the purpose of these 
medical marijuana statues, which is to promote the health, safety, and welfare of 
citizens. At the judicial level, courts should dismiss employers’ arguments that 
federal law precludes states from applying state discrimination laws. Medical 
marijuana patients should be able to state a claim under state disability discrimi-
nation statutes. At the legislative level, state legislatures ought to amend their 
current medical marijuana statutes to afford statutory employment discrimination 
protection to qualified patients. These solutions will best balance the competing 
interests of employees and employers. It is high time that states protect disabled 
employees from suffering employment discrimination due to their use of a state-
sanctioned, therapeutic remedy. 
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